

Politics

T H E

10.

POLITICKS

On BOTH SIDES,

With REGARD to

FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Stated from their own WRITINGS, and
examined by the Course of EVENTS.

W I T H

Some OBSERVATIONS on the

PRESENT STATE of AFFAIRS

I N

GREAT BRITAIN,

And the Effects of our NEGOTIATIONS, for
several Years past.

Juxta se posita magis elucescunt.

L O N D O N:

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POLITICS

OF THE

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AND

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

OF THE


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


T H E

POLITICKS *on both Sides,*

With REGARD to

Foreign Affairs, &c.

“  H E whole Face of Affairs in
 “ *Europe* is, within the Space of
 “ the last Year, so much alter'd,
 “ that it is almost impossible for
 “ the most unconcern'd Spectator
 “ to prevent his Thoughts from
 “ running out into Questions and
 “ Suppositions about it. *Curiosity* it self, the low-
 “ est Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its
 “ Way into such a Scene ; and will expect, or in-
 “ vent, some Account of so surprizing a Change
 “ from a CALM, hardly parallel'd by any PAST
 “ PROSPECT, to a sudden Gathering of CLOUDS ;
 “ which, if not soon dissipated, must burst and
 “ discharge Themselves somewhere or other.

“ But when *Self-Interest* is join'd to this *natu-*
 “ *ral Curiosity*, and it becomes a *personal* and *na-*
 “ *tional Concern* to know the main Causes and
 “ Springs of *such Events*, as all are interested in ;
 “ there seems then to be a RIGHT, strictly so cal-

“ led, to demand and receive all the Satisfaction
 “ the Nature of such Affairs can permit to be
 “ given. In a *free Nation* especially, where no
 “ Resolutions can be effectual without the Con-
 “ sent and Support of the Community, every
 “ Man, who can think at all, will think it an *in-*
 “ *jurious Treatment*, if, at a proper Time and in
 “ a proper Manner, *some Light be not held forth to*
 “ *them*, and some satisfactory Solution given of
 “ *such Appearances*, as must otherwise very much
 “ perplex and disturb Him.

I chuse to begin this Discourse in the very same
 Words with the Author of the * ENQUIRY, about
 seven Years ago; not only because the present
 State of Affairs in *Europe* seems to be as like the
 State of Affairs, at that Time, as two Conjun-
 ctures can possibly resemble each other; but like-
 wise for a Justification of the *present Enquiry*, to
 which I think myself equally intitled, though per-
 haps not so well instructed as *that Writer*; and
 “ † every *Briton*, who, either by his Treasure or
 “ his Blood, by his Vote or his Interest, by his
 “ Person or his Representative, hath in Time past
 “ borne any Part in procuring the *common Peace*,
 “ and establishing the several Interests of *Europe*;
 “ every such Member of the *British* Nation, who
 “ by *this Time* flatter’d Himself with Hopes of
 “ enjoying the Result of all his *Toil*, and *Taxes*,
 “ and *Blood*, in an *universal Peace*, and an *extend-*
 “ *ed, undisturb’d Commerce*, hath a Right to ask
 “ —How comes this Face of Things to be again
 “ overclouded? —All *Europe* once more in *Agi-*
 “ *tation*!

It is not improbable that *Those*, *† in whose Time
 of

* See an Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great
 Britain, &c. p. 3.

† Id. p. 4.

*† Ib.

of Power such a Crisis of political Affairs appears in the World, may ascribe it intirely to an Event, which no human Wisdom could possibly foresee; I mean the Death of the late King of Poland; but whether it is really owing to *that Incident*, or to some *other Causes* more remote, shall be the Business of our present Enquiry.

When I first took the Resolution of writing upon this Subject, I propos'd, for the Sake of Impartiality, not only to state the *Politicks on both Sides from their own Writings*, but to place their respective Arguments upon every material Topick of Debate, for several Years past, in opposite Columns, and in their own Words; with no farther Remarks upon them than what should be just necessary to connect them together, and make them generally understood. This, no Doubt, would have been the most effectual Way to obviate the common Complaints against *political Writers*, and to purge myself from the Imputation of designing to misrepresent the Arguments on *either Side*, or to draw false Conclusions from them. But, upon Trial, I found the Reasoning of *some Writers*, whom I am oblig'd to quote, so very diffus'd, and scatter'd up and down in several Parts of the *same Book*, or reiterated with frequent Variations in *others*, according to the different Circumstances of Affairs; that I could not put my first Design in Execution, without swelling *this Treatise* to a much larger Bulk, than would be either proper, or agreeable upon such an Occasion. I was therefore oblig'd to take a shorter Method, by collecting their Sense together, and reducing their Arguments, upon several Points, into Propositions, with marginal References to the *Writers Themselves*. As I chuse this Method for the Reader's Ease

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more than my own ; so I assure the Publick that wherever I find myself under this Necessity of abridging the Arguments on *either Side*, I will do it with the utmost Exactness and Fidelity, as far as I understand them my self ; and though it may be soon perceived to *which Side* I am inclined, I shall scorn to attempt any mean Triumph over the *other*, or to impose on the World, by any wilful Misrepresentation ; for I think it not only an unfair, but a most ridiculous Way of writing upon any disputable, or disputed Subject, to wrest the Words of an *Adversary*, or the Measures, upon which they are founded, to any Meaning, or Consequences, which do not naturally result from them. Such Artifices as These may impose upon Persons, unacquainted with the Point in Debate, and serve the little Purposes of a *temporary Expedient* ; but will always recoil at last upon *Those*, who make use of them, and do most Hurt to *that Cause*, which they are calculated to promote.

This being premised, as the Rule of my own Conduct in the present Enquiry, I shall now proceed to a cursory View of the principal Transactions for several Years past, and the Sentiments of *both Parties* upon them, as they appear in their Writings ; with some Observations on the Course of *Events*, as the surest Guides to us for discovering the true Causes of the present Commotions in *Europe*.

It is acknowledged, on *both Sides*, that all our late *Negotiations* and *Expedients*, to preserve the publick Tranquility, were occasioned by the first Treaty of *Vienna* and the Counter-Alliance of *Hanover*, which succeeded it ; for his late Majesty was pleased to assure us from the Throne, in the Year 1724, *that We had Peace with ALL POWERS abroad* ; but We had scarce Time to congratulate

ourselves on this happy Situation of Affairs, before the whole Scene was again embroiled, as the *Enquirer* most pathetically complains in the Passages before cited. The chief Point therefore in Dispute at that Time was, to what Causes so sudden and, as it was called, so *unaccountable a Conjunction* was really owing. The *Court-Writers*, as well as their *Patrons*, imputed it, in the most peremptory Manner, to the dangerous Designs of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, against the Liberties of *Europe* in general, as well as the most valuable Interests of *Great Britain* in particular. The *Writers on the other Side* seemed to look upon it only as a *defensive Treaty* between two Nations, whose Interest it was to ally Themselves to each other at that particular Juncture. This Point was fully canvass'd about Five Years ago, by * a Gentleman, who wrote under the Name of JOHN TROT, and the Author of the *Enquiry*; in the Course of which Debate, I think it was indubitably proved that the Prospect of the *Infanta's* being sent back from *France*, after the Duke of *Orleans's* Death, induced the Court of *Spain* to begin a Negotiation with the *Emperor*; and that her being actually sent back, with our *Refusal of the sole Mediation*, determined his *Catholick Majesty* to put a finishing Hand to *that Treaty*. To This it was added that our Refusal to restore *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, in Pursuance of a *Promise*, as They pretended, founded on a LETTER from his late Majesty to the King of *Spain*, might be another Motive to such a Resolution at the Court of *Madrid*; for though the very Existence of any *such Letter* was at first strenuously denied, a Copy of it hath been since produced

* See Trot's second Letter to the Craftsman, Vol. 4. p. 74. Defence of the Enquiry, p. 14. John Trot's third Letter to the Craftsman, Vol. 4. p. 272.

duced in both Houses of Parliament ; and if it does not contain an *absolute Promise*, yet it furnishes Them with a Pretension, at least, to found such a Claim upon it. It was likewise suggested, not without some Grounds, that our concluding a *private Treaty* at *Madrid*, in the Year 1721, whilst We were Mediators between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, gave such an Umbrage at the Court of *Vienna* as help'd to pave the Way to a Reconciliation between *those two Powers* ; one of whom had received a very great Indignity from the Court of *France*, and the *other* not a little displeas'd with That of *Great Britain* upon the Account beforementioned. It deserves a Remark in this Place, that *Spain* depended upon *France* as her Friend at the Congress, and the *Emperor* look'd upon *Great Britain* in the same Light ; but *both Parties* being thus disobliged by the *respective Mediators*, on whom They rely'd, it became almost necessary for the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* to contrive some Method of reconciling Themselves. This seems, at least, a plausible Reason for * “ two Powers, that could hardly be
 “ kept within the Bounds of common Decency to-
 “ wards one another, by all the Address of *two*
 “ *powerful Mediators* in a publick Treaty, abandon-
 “ ing *that Mediation*; and, in the Middle of it,
 “ privately running into one another's Arms with
 “ all the Marks of cordial Affection and a reso-
 “ lute Friendship.

But whatever might be the true Grounds of this sudden Revolution of Counsels and Dispositions in the *two Courts*; it is certain that the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Measures taken in Opposition to it, laid the Foundation of that long Series of Negotiations, Conventions, and Projects of Ac-
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commodation, which engross'd all our Attention for several Years together. Let us therefore review the Conduct of *both Parties*, upon this Occasion.

Now, if the Treaty of *Vienna* contain'd nothing but an Accommodation of Differences between the *two Courts*, with the usual Stipulations of *Peace, Commerce* and *mutual Defence*, (as the *contracting Parties* declared) We had no Occasion to take such an Alarm, or to be in such an Hurry of putting our selves in a Posture of Defence. We ought rather to have rejoiced that *these Powers* had found out a Method of adjusting their own Differences, after We had attempted it in vain; since nothing else was wanting at that Time, as We have been often told, to compleat the general Repose and Tranquility of *Europe*. Nay, it would certainly have been our Interest, in such a Case, to accede to *that Treaty*, as We were invited to do, instead of entertaining such terrible Apprehensions from it, and taking such extraordinary Measures to defeat it.

But it must be confess'd, at the same Time, that if the Allies of *Vienna* had really entered into any such dangerous Engagements as our *Politicians* apprehended, and their *Advocates* positively asserted, it was certainly their Duty to oppose them with the utmost Vigour.

For this Reason, the *Author of the Enquiry* made it his chief Business to prove that there was a *secret, offensive Treaty* between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, besides those publick ones of *Peace* and *Commerce*, which They had communicated to the World. Nay, He pretended to be so well inform'd of *this Fact*, that He gave us the particular Articles of it; viz. " 1. * That the Empe-

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* *Enquiry*, p. 34.

“ror was to assist *Spain*, in obtaining *Gibraltar* by Force. 2. That *Spain* was to support the Emperor, in his new Establishment of the *Ostend Company*; for both which Purposes, as He told us, the Quota’s of *Money* on one Side, and of *Soldiers* on the other were actually settled. 3. That the two Courts had undertaken to place the Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*; and to begin with that Enterprize, before They proceeded to put their other Projects in Execution.” These were Points, which particularly affected *Great Britain*, in her tenderest Concerns. But the same Author likewise discovered another Article in this secret, offensive Treaty, which had the same bad Aspect upon all *Europe*, and threatened Her with universal Monarchy; “* I mean, says He, the Marriages of the two *Arch-Duchesses*, Daughters to the present Emperor, with the two *Infants of Spain*, Sons to the King by the present Queen.” He then observes, “that such an Alliance must constitute a Power in one Family beyond all, that We have known, formidable and irresistible.” In another Place, He leaves us to judge, “† whether ever hitherto any one Scheme hath appeared in *Europe*, of a Destruction so universal, and of a Ruin so extended, as This appears plainly to be.

It was indeed alledged that even in the publick Treaty of *Vienna* greater Privileges in Commerce were granted to the *† Emperor’s Subjects than to Those of *Great Britain*; but the Fallhood of this Assertion appeared very plainly from the Treaty itself, which puts Them only on the same Foot with the most favoured Nations; and *Great Britain* having long been in that Number, whatever Privileges

* Enquiry, p. 86.

*† Enquiry, p. 62.

† Ib. p. 91.

(II)

vileges of *Trade* any other Nation may obtain from his *Catholick Majesty*, must be conceded to *Us*, at the same Time, by Virtue of former *Treaties*. Besides, the King of *Spain* immediately disown'd any such Design by his Ministers, and afterwards in a formal Article of a Treaty; which is so remarkable that I cannot forbear quoting it.

“ * *The Ministers of his Britannick Majesty*, and
“ of his *most Christian Majesty* having PRETENDED
“ that in the *Treaties* concluded at *Vienna* be-
“ tween the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*, in the
“ Year 1725, there were diverse *Clauses*, that in-
“ fringed the Articles of the several *Treaties* of
“ *Commerce*, or of the *Treaties* of *Peace*, in which
“ *Commerce* may be concerned, antecedent to the
“ Year 1725; his *Catholick Majesty* hath declared,
“ as He declares by the present Article, that He
“ never MEANT to grant, nor will suffer to sub-
“ sist, by virtue of the said *Treaties* of *Vienna*,
“ any *Privilege* contrary to the *Treaties* here above
“ confirmed.

It was likewise affirmed that the *Emperor's Minister* had acknowledged some Engagement with *Spain*, relating to *Gibraltar*; but it appears from the † *Enquiry* itself that his *Imperial Majesty* entered into this Engagement upon the Representation of the Court of *Spain*, that there remain'd still some Things to regulate between his *Catholick Majesty* and the King of *Great Britain*; in which, it is probable that the Court of *Spain* might include the famous *Letter* of 1721, upon which They founded their Pretensions and Demand of *Gibraltar*; but the *Emperor* would engage no farther than to employ his *Mediation* between Them, under these Restrictions; that the Points in Dispute had

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* See the *Treaty of Seville*, in the original *French*, Art 5

† *Ib.* p. 21.

any Relation to the Treaty of London, or arose in Consequence of that Treaty; nor even then, unless it should prove agreeable to his Britannick Majesty.— In another Part of the same Book it appears, * that a NOBLE PERSON in an high Station having publicly declared it, in the House of Lords, as an undoubted Truth, that there was a secret, offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, which contain'd Articles in it destructive to the Rights of Britain, both with Regard to its Possessions and its Commerce abroad; the Imperial Resident here was ordered to give Satisfaction to the British Court, upon this Subject, by producing the Article, which his Master had entered into, relating to GIBRALTAR; and this Article imply'd no more than that his Imperial Majesty had engaged to use his good Offices, if it should be agreeable to his Britannick Majesty, as his Minister had before declared. But all these Assurances were far from giving our Politicians, or their Advocate the Enquirer, any Satisfaction that there was no such Engagement; though the Event hath sufficiently shew'd that the Emperor never gave his Catholick Majesty the least Assistance towards the Recovery of that Place, whilst it was besieg'd, nor at any other Time, during our long Misunderstanding with those Courts.

As for the OSTEND COMPANY, it was always treated as a Point of so little Consequence to our essential Interests, on † one Side; and hath since been declared so by the *† other; that I shall not detain the Reader with any particular Detail of the Controversies about it. But it may not be amiss just to take Notice, as We pass along, that this Company

* p. 35.

† See the *Craftsman*, Vol. 1. p. 202.

*† See the *London Journal*, Dec. 21, 1728; or the *Craftsman*, Vol. 4. p. 84.

Company hath accidentally proved of great Detriment to us, not only by contributing to the late Disturbances in *Europe*, but likewise by putting all Countries upon Projects of the same Kind; and though his *Imperial Majesty* hath at length consented to the Abolition of the *Company* at *Ostend*, He is far from having given up all Thoughts of the *Trade*, being now carrying on a Negotiation at *Lisbon* for that Purpose.

Let us therefore return to the *secret, offensive Treaty*; by which the two Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, as the *Enquirer* asserted, had not only entered into the strongest Engagements upon all these Points, but likewise to place the Pretender upon the Throne of *Great Britain*. This was, indeed, an alarming Consideration, and what might justly provoke the Resentments of a free People; especially, when They were assured, in the most authoritative Manner, "that * the *British* Court " had positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from " more than one Person, and such as could be " tirely depended on, that one express Article of " this Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain* contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the PRETENDER, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt " for Him in *England*, before opening the War " in any other Parts."—It is no Wonder, I say, that the Passions of the People were inflamed by such Declarations as These, and broke out into the warmest Addresses against those Powers, whom They supposed to be engaged in such destructive Measures. Some of Them were so very zealous, upon this Occasion, that They not only express'd their chearful Acquiescence under a Land-Tax of † four Skillings in the Pound, but made a voluntary Offer

* Enquiry, p. 52.

† Totness Address.

Offer of the *other sixteen, and of every Thing else, that is dear and valuable to Them.*

Here likewise I must repeat my Acknowledgment, that if the Intelligence of *such a Design* was well founded, our *Ministers* were not only fully justify'd in all their Precautions to defeat it, but would have been justify'd in much farther Lengths than They thought fit to go. But when all this *positive Intelligence, convincing Evidence, and pretended Certainty* appeared to be founded only on * *SUSPICIONS, or something more than SUSPICIONS, built upon APPEARANCES*; or at best, when the whole Evidence, as † *another Writer* fums it up, consisted in nothing but *Wharton's Rambles, Ripperda's Chit-chat, Hearsays of what one great Man writ, concerning what another great Man said, three Muscovite Ships coming to Spain, Embarkations, which were never made, and Armies, which were never assembled*; when This, I say, appeared to be the Case, many Persons were inclined to suspend their Belief of any *such Design*, till They saw it a little more authentically proved; especially, since his *Imperial Majesty* thought fit to disown it by his *Minister* here, in the most solemn Manner; which He had no Occasion to do, if He was really grown so inveterate against his *Britannick Majesty*, as the *Court-Writers* represented Him. Nay, I have been informed, upon pretty good Authority, that long before Mr. *Palm's* Memorial, or the *Enquiry* was published, his *Imperial Majesty* took an Opportunity of declaring, upon the Faith of a *Christian* and the Word of an *Emperor*, that He was so far from having enter'd into any Measures for placing the *Pretender* on the *British Throne*, that no such Overtures had been made to Him. If This should be true, as I hope it is not,

* *Enquiry*, p. 33.

† *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 257.

not, what shall We say to *those Men*, who inflamed the Nation to such an Height, upon this Account, and——Let Them read their own Article of Impeachment against the late Earl of Oxford, for *corrupting the Fountain of Truth, and putting Falshoods into the Mouth of Majesty.*

Her Czarish Majesty likewise purged Herself from the same Charge, by a solemn Declaration * that she had never enter'd into any Engagements with the Pretender against his *Britannick Majesty*, and that she look'd upon all such Reports as meer Calumnies spread abroad by the *English Ministers*, in order to justify their Measures at home, and prejudice foreign Courts against Her.

The Gentlemen on the *Country Side* were therefore justify'd, as far as *Events* could justify them, in their Backwardness to believe any *such Design*; for from that Time to This there hath not been any Attempt, nor any Appearance of an Attempt, in Favour of the Pretender. Nay, even the *Court-Writers* themselves seem'd to be ashamed of this Argument a Year or two after, when all their *positive and undoubted Intelligence* dwindled away to † APPREHENSIONS ONLY that there might be Engagements, in Favour of the Pretender. I believe They have since made a Discovery that even their *Apprehensions* were groundless, and that there never were any *such Engagements*, either *ostensible*, or *non-ostensible*.

However, these Alarms had such an Effect, at that Time, on the Minds of *some Men*, that instead of advising his Majesty to accede to the *Vienna Treaty*, under any Conditions, They thought it

* *Roussel*, vol. 4. p. 222.

† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* printed for Roberts, in the Year 1729, p. 49. *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 245.

it immediately necessary to project a *Counter-Alliance*; which was concluded at *Hanover* soon after, and laid the Foundation of fresh Disputes, both at Home and Abroad.

The first contracting Parties in *this Treaty* were the Crowns of *Great Britain, France* and *Prussia*; who invited the *States General*, by an express Article, to accede to it, and agreed to invite others. But the *Dutch*, who had this particular Compliment paid Them in the *Treaty* it self, did not accede to it, till about eleven Months after it had been sign'd at *Hanover*, and even then under * *very large Restrictions*.

About the same Time, his Majesty of *Prussia* took an Opportunity of detaching Himself from *this Alliance*, in which He was an original Party. Whether this Divilion was occasion'd by the Affair of *Thorn*, which was suffer'd to dye away, as soon as the *Treaty* was made, or by any other Cause, I cannot say; but every good Protestant must lament any Misunderstandings between two Crowns, which are so nearly ally'd as Those of *Great Britain* and *Prussia*.

However, to compensate this Loss of one Ally, We soon gain'd another in the King and Kingdom of *Sweden*, who acceded to this Treaty under certain † Modifications and Restrictions, by the persuasive Eloquence of Count *Horn*, who acquainted the States *† that the *Treaty* of *HANOVER* did not lay Them under so many Obligations as FORMER TREATIES; though They were to receive a Subsidy of *fifty thousand Pounds a Year*, for three Years, both from *England* and *France*, as the Price of their Accession.

The

* *General Collection of Treaties, &c.* printed for *Knapton*, &c. p. 153.

† *Ib.* p. 166.

*† *Roussel*, vol. 3. p. 300.

The King of *Denmark* was afterwards prevail'd upon to follow the same Example, in Consideration of a *large Subsidy*, for four Years, and other Stipulations in his Favour. It was expressly agreed in the Treaty that this Subsidy should be paid by the *most Christian King*; but a Dispute arising, some Years afterwards, between the Crowns of *France* and *Denmark*, concerning the Difference of † *Danish* and *Hamburg* Money, We were so good as to prevent the ill Consequences of such a Dispute, by paying the Difference our selves; which amounted to a considerable Sum.

The * *Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel* contracted likewise with his *Britannick Majesty* to keep a Body of 12,000 Men in a Readiness for his Service, upon certain Conditions, which do not fully appear in the *publick Convention*, nor any where else; but it is well known that *these Troops* have cost the *British Nation* almost a *Million and an half Sterl.* without doing us the least Service, during the whole Time They continued in our Pay.

Amongst all these Allies and Auxiliaries, I must not forget his Serene Highness the Duke of *† *Wolffenbuttle*; who brought up the Rear of this formidable Confederacy, and not only engaged to GUARANTY all his Majesty's Dominions in *Great Britain, Ireland* and *Germany*, but likewise to furnish a Body of 5000 Men (not to be moved out of *Germany*, or *Holland*) for so small a Sum as *twenty-five thousand Pounds per Annum*, during the Space of *four Years*; which amounted, for the whole Term, to no more than *one hundred thousand Pounds*.

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† *Votes of the House of Commons* for the Year 1731-2, or the *Craftsman*, No. 313. * *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4, p. 438. *† *Ib.* 178.

Having now stated the Case of the *Hanover Alliance* in its full Strength, We are naturally led to the Reasonings of *different Parties*, on this Subject.

The Gentlemen of the *Country Party* argued that, supposing the *secret Treaty of Vienna* to be without Foundation, We were a little too precipitate in throwing off an *old Ally*, under that Pretence; and though They were very far from adopting the vulgar Notion, † *that ENGLAND ought never to be in Peace and Friendship with FRANCE*, They apprehended that so *close a Conjunction*, at that Time, naturally tended to make us too dependent upon Her, and would not produce the good Effects, which were proposed by it.

To This it was answer'd by the *other Party*, that * *Power is fluctuating, and though We did lend the Emperor an helping Hand, We are not to let Him do what He pleases; that when We set Him up, it was good Politicks, and now it is equally good to take Him down; or, as the *† Enquirer more gravely argued, that We should find in HIM, at last, the Enemy We dreaded only in ANOTHER.* In short, it was then the *Court-Doctrine* that *France* was so much reduced, and the *Emperor* grown so formidable by the Success of the late War, that the *Ballance of Europe* required us to shift Hands, and throw our Weight into the Scale of *France*, which was now become our most *natural Ally*. For this Reason, it was argued that We might safely rely on her good *Faith* and *Sincerity*; nay, a *certain Gentleman* undertook to be her *Guaranty*, and made Himself answerable for her Conduct,

† *Craftsman*, vol. 1. p. 111. *The Case of Dunkirk*, p. 47. or the *Craftsman*, vol. 6. p. 208.

* See a *Letter to the occasional Writer*, printed in the Year 1727; or the *occasional Writer*, No. 3. p. 13.

*† p. 7.

Conduct, by repeated Declarations in the *House of Commons*.

Let us now proceed to the Consequences of *this Alliance*, and see how far the Reasonings of *either Party* were justify'd by them.

As the *Treaty of Hanover* was concerted with a profess'd Design to defeat the dangerous Projects of the *Vienna Allies*; it was evident at first Sight that such Measures would be taken, as must necessarily create some farther Misunderstandings, if not an absolute Rupture, between the different Parties in the *two Alliances*; for when such strong Suspicions are entertain'd on *one Side*, as to put Them in Arms against the *other*, and the *latter* know Themselves to be innocent of the *Designs* laid to their Charge, They will naturally look upon *such Apprehensions* as meer Pretences to pick a Quarrel with Them, and resent those Measures as *Acts of Hostility*, which are carried on under Colour of *self-Defence*.

How far This was our Case, with Relation to the *Spaniards*, at the Time I am speaking of; or how far the *Spaniards*, at least, might reason in such a Manner, will soon appear by the Event.

The Conclusion of the *Treaty of Hanover* was immediately followed with a considerable Augmentation of our *Land-Forces* at home, besides the 12,000 *Hessians*, and *other foreign Troops* retain'd in our Pay, as I have already observed.

At the same Time, *three large Squadrons of Ships of War* were fitted out at a vast Expence, and dispatch'd with all possible Expedition to different Parts of the World; *one* to the *Baltick*, *another* to the Coast of *Spain*, and a *third* to the *West-Indies*. The Motives for equipping *these Fleets*, and the good Effects They produced, are stated very pompously in the *Enquiry*.

That sent to the * *Baltick*, says He, was design'd to prevent the *Czarina's* Scheme for deposing the King of *Sweden*, and thereby preserve the *Ballance of the North*. But it happened a little untowardly, that *Sweden* had just before made Peace with the *Muscovites*, and was under no Apprehension from Them; as They acquainted Sir *Charles Wager*, our Admiral, when He came before *Stockholm*, and made Them a voluntary Offer of his Assistance. Another right reverend Gentleman, who afterwards wrote upon the same Subject, tells us that *this Squadron* was sent to the *Baltick*, not only to prevent the *Czarina's* Design, but † to enable our FRIENDS in *Sweden* to declare for us, by awing the Duke of *Holstein's* Party, who did all in their Power to obstruct the *Accession*. This, it seems, with the *Subsidy* before-mentioned to the King, and some other proper Applications to the leading Men, produced the desired Effect, and sufficiently justify'd *that Expedition*.

The Squadron sent to the Coasts of *† *Spain* was ordered to prevent an Attempt from thence, in Favour of the Pretender, by virtue of the *secret, offensive Treaty* so often mentioned; and the Enquirer tells us ** *that the Appearance of this Fleet upon the Spanish Coasts did actually prevent the Execution of such an Attempt*. But here again that Writer seems to be mistaken, or misinform'd; for it appears by Sir *John Fennings's* Letter, dated Aug. 10, 1726, and made publick here, *†* *that the Spaniards were so little prepared to invade Us, that when He came on their Coasts, They seem'd to*
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* Enquiry, p. 95.

† *The Treaty of Seville impartially considered*, printed for *Reveris*, in the Year 1730, p. 10. or the *Craftsman*, vol. 6, p. 66.

*† Enquiry, p. 95.

** *Ib.* p. 97.

† See the Letter it self; or the *Craftsman*, vol. 4, p. 269.

be in the greatest Consternation ; that all the Troops They could assemble did not exceed three thousand Men ; and that Those were in very bad Condition.

As to the Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*, the * *same Author* tells us that it fully answered the Purposes, for which it was intended, “ not only by “ protecting the *Trade* of his Majesty’s Subjects “ in those Parts from the Depredations of the *Spaniards*, but also by preventing the Return of the “ *Galleons* with their Stores of Money, and thereby disappointing *those Attempts*, which would “ have been made, and perhaps succeeded, had such “ Riches come to their Aid.

Let us now turn our Eyes a little to the *other contracting Powers in the Treaty of Hanover*, and see what Part They acted, during all these expensive and hazardous Expeditions on *our Side*.

The *Enquirer* told us that † “ the Dispositions “ made by FRANCE, ever since the signing of the “ *Treaty of Hanover*, more than kept Pace with “ Us, in the Largeness of the Expence.” To support this Assertion, He assured us, “ that the “ *most Christian King* augmented his regular “ Troops with *twenty-five thousand Men*; and, at “ the same Time, ordered a Levy of the *Militia*, to the Number of *sixty thousand Men*; “ besides *twelve thousand Invalids*, put into good “ Order, for the Defence of his *Citadels* and “ *Forts*; by which Means *that King* could, without Inconvenience, send 165,000 Men of his *regular Troops* into the Field. Such, *says He*, “ hath been the Disposition there, for some Time, “ in order to shew the *new Allies* (meaning of “ *Vienna*) that *France* is not only in Earnest, but “ in

* *Enquiry*, p. 94. 96.

† *Id.* 102.

“ in a well-disposed Condition of disputing any Attempts against *itself*, or its ALLIES.

Now, supposing all This to be true, it is very far from doing the *Court-Party* any Service in the present Argument; for if the *French* had actually made any *such Dispositions*, I believe the *Enquirer* would be very much puzzled to prove that They *more than kept Pace with Us, in the Largeness of the Expence*; or that the *Allies* ever received any Benefit from them. But We may go a little farther, and defy Him to prove that there really was any such Augmentation either of their *regular Troops*, or their *Militia*, as He seems to assert, whatever *Dispositions* might have been made, or *Orders* given for that Purpose. Indeed, to speak impartially, the Court of *France* seemed ready enough to perform their Engagements with us, against the *Emperor*; but We found out, at last, that the Execution of them would not be entirely consistent with our *own Interest*, and therefore very wisely excused Them.

The *same Author* acknowledges that the * united Provinces *came late into the Alliance*; which He ascribes to the *Frame of their Constitution*; but, perhaps, it might be partly owing to the *Nature of the Treaty itself*; and I am sure He might have added very justly, that They acceded at last, under † *very extensive Limitations*. However, He assured us, that “ from the Time of their *Accession*, They shew’d a Warmth and Vigour “ worthy of the Occasion. They agreed unanimously, *said He*, upon such Augmentations of their LAND FORCES, as by the next Spring “ would make them above 50,000 effective Men; “ and the necessary Measures were taking for their “ having

* *Enquiry*, p. 103.

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 153.

“ having a FLEET at Sea of twenty Men of War.” He added, “ that They had been at a very great Charge, in providing their *Magazines*, and putting their *Barrier* and *Frontier Places* into a good Posture of Defence.

To This it was answered, that the *States* made no farther Augmentation of their *Land-Forces* than what was immediately necessary for their own Defence, and the Support of their *Barrier Towns*, in Pursuance of *Treaties*. How far They have put these *Places* into a good Posture of Defence, let their late *Act of Neutrality*, and the present State of Affairs determine. As to their *Fleet*, whatever Measures might have been taken for fitting one out, every Body knows that they were never put in Execution.—But of This I shall speak more particularly in another Place.

We were afterwards told, in * *another Treatise*, that his Majesty, as Elector, promised a Body of twelve thousand Men, to join the Danes; and for that Purpose increased his Hanoverian Troops from sixteen thousand to twenty two thousand Men. But That is a Point, which I am told would bear some farther Explanation than the *Author* was pleased to give it.—I shall only observe that the Deficiency of the *French Subsidy* to *Denmark* was partly made good by certain Deductions out of the Money, granted by Parliament for the Support of the *Hessian Forces*; and that when † *some Gentlemen* desired to be inform’d whether any more and what Deductions had been made out of that Money, the Motion was very prudently rejected.

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* *Considerations on the present State of Affairs in Europe*, &c. printed for Roberts in the Year 1730 P. 16.

† See the *Votes of the House of Commons* for that Year.

As for the Courts of *Sweden, Denmark, Hesse* and *Wolfenbuttle*, They were rather *stipendiary Auxiliaries* than *Allies* and *Confederates*; so that They had little more to do than to receive our Money, in regular Payments, and keep their Troops in a Readiness to march, whenever We should demand them. — How far They complied even with these Terms, I am not able to say, the Nation having never had any Occasion for their Service.

France and *Holland* were therefore the two Powers, on whom We chiefly rely'd; and as They were much more essentially interested in the Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty* than *Great Britain*, We had Reason to expect that They should bear, at least, an equal Proportion in the Danger and Expence of opposing it. — This Point therefore ought to be examined a little farther.

I said that immediately after the Conclusion of the *Hanover Treaty*, We dispatch'd three large Squadrons to the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean*, and the *West-Indies*. The *first* of these produced little more Effect than procuring the Accession of *Sweden*, at a very great Expence to this Nation; but the *other two* were attended with Consequences so well known, that they hardly require any Comment. The *Instructions* to our Admirals were certainly as moderate as were ever sent out with *two such naval Armaments*; yet even blocking up the *Galleons* at *Porto Bello* with *one* of them, and hovering round the Coasts of *old Spain*, in an hostile Manner, with the *other*, were look'd upon at that Court as *Acts of Hostility*, and resented accordingly. Orders were immediately dispatch'd for seizing the *South Sea Ship*, and the Effects belonging to that Company at *la vera Cruz*. The *Spanish Guarda Costa's* and *Privateers* were let loose upon our Merchants,

chants, and committed infinite Depredations for several Years together, without any Interruption, or any Reprizals. At the same Time, the *Flo- tilla*, which was said to be at least as richly laden as the *Galleons*, had the good Fortune to escape our *other Squadron* in the *Mediterranean*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*; though it is confess'd † that *They steer'd the very Course, where He was station'd to intercept them.* But This was imputed to *long Nights*, and *dark, foggy Weather.* It was likewise observed, and never contradicted, as well as I can remember, that * several Ships were suffer'd to pass by the *same Squadron*, even under the Stern of our Admiral, with *Stores, Provisions* and *other Necessaries* for the Use of the *Spanish Camp*, which was then in Sight of *Gibraltar*, and preparing to besiege it. — But, perhaps, This likewise might be occasion'd by *long Nights*, and *foggy Weather.*

The Siege of *that Place* immediately ensued; and though We had been often assured, both within Doors and without, that our *Allies* would make it *Casus Fæderis*, and assist us in the Defence of it, They suffer'd the *Siege* to be push'd on with the utmost Vigour, for several Months, without giving us the least Succour of *Men, Money*, or *Ships*; and the *Spaniards*, in Return, permitted Them to carry on their Trade, both in *Europe* and the *Indies*, without any Molestation; whilst They were continually harassing us, both by *Sea* and *Land*; to say nothing farther of our *Ships*, which were destroyed, and our *Seamen*, who perished by Thousands in the Service of their Country. Perhaps, our *Allies* might judge the *Blockade of Portobello* to be an *Act of Hostility*, as well as the

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† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* printed for Roberts in the Year 1729; p. 33. * *Craftsman*, vol. 4, p. 336.

Spaniards, and consequently not think Them-
selves obliged to support the *aggressing Party*, by
Virtue of a *defensive Alliance*. But whatever might
be the Reasons of their Conduct, it is certain that
They took no Part in our Quarrels with *Spain*,
nor so much as moved one Man to our Assistance.
Nay, even *We* contented our selves with the bare
Defence of *Gibraltar*, so loudly demanded by the
Voice of the Nation, without endeavouring to di-
vert Them from the Siege, by bombarding any
of their Ports, or ravaging their Coasts; for * *as*
soon as the Treaties were made, the Accessions pro-
cured, and the Army provided, at the Expence of
Britain, which were necessary for defending lower
Saxony, We seemed to have no more to do in the
War.—These were the *vigorous Measures*, so
strongly recommended in the †† *Enquiry*, as abso-
lutely necessary in such a *Crisis of Danger*, and up-
on which He founds all his Apology for the Con-
duct of the *Ministry*.

At length, † *Preliminaries* for a general Paci-
fication were agreed upon; by which a *Cessation of*
Hostilities, on both Sides, was stipulated for *seven*
Years; and that within *four Months* after signing
this Convention, a Congress should be form'd, in
which *all the Rights and PRETENSIONS of the*
contracting Powers should be examined, discuss'd
and determined. But as soon as the *Articles* were
produced in Publick, it was immediately foreseen,
on *one Side*, that the dark and ambiguous Manner
of wording them would give Occasion to many
Cavils and Disputes; particularly the *second*, which
runs in the following mysterious Terms; *viz.*

“ *† The Rights, or those Things, which, by
“ Vir-

* *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 300.

93. 110.

p. 174.

†† *Enquiry*, p. 81.

† *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4.

*† *Ib.* vol. 4. p. 175.

“ Virtue of the Treaties of *Utrecht, Baden* and
 “ *Quadruple Alliance*, and also of *those Treaties*
 “ and *Conventions*, that preceded the Year 1725,
 “ and do not affect the *Emperor* and the States
 “ General of the *united Netherlands*, have been
 “ possess’d by any of the *contracting Powers*, shall
 “ remain untouch’d ; but if any Thing should be
 “ found to have been alter’d therein, or not to
 “ have been put in Execution, the *Alteration made*,
 “ or the *Thing not executed*, shall, in a *Congress* to
 “ be held, be discuss’d and decided, according to
 “ the Tenor of the said *Treaties* and *Conventions*.

As soon, I say, as *this Article* was read, many Gentlemen apprehended some latent Design in it; and the Authors of the † *Craftsman* plainly intimated that this studied Ambiguity was made use of to conceal the true Intent of the *Article* from common Observation; I mean *that the Spanish Pretension to Gibraltar was to be discuss’d and decided at the Congress*.

On the *other Side*, it was asserted that *this Article* was so far from preserving the Claim of *Gibraltar* to the *Spaniards*, that it absolutely extinguished it. This Point was canvass’d at large by the * *Author of the Enquiry* and *John Trot*, to whom I refer the Reader, and believe He will find that the *latter* had as much the Advantage of his Adversary in the *Argument*, as He afterwards had in the *Event*.

It was likewise apprehended by the Gentlemen of the *Country Party*, that some other Stipulations in the *Preliminaries* were not express’d in such full and plain Terms, as to cut off all Pretences for any farther Wrangling and Chicane. But the Gen-

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† *Craftsman*, vol. 2. p. 64. 118.

* *Defence of the Enquiry*, p. 26. *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 288.

tllemen on the *other Side* affected to laugh at these Apprehensions, as the Phantoms of distemper'd Brains, or the Artifices of factious Malecontents congratulating Themselves on having surmounted all Difficulties, and laid the Foundation of a *solid and lasting Peace*.

Yet here again the *Country Party* were fully justifi'd in their Suspicions by the *Event*; for the *Preliminaries* were no sooner sign'd, than new Disputes began to be started about the *Meaning* of them, † and such Interpretations to be put upon the Words of these Articles, as utterly destroyed the real Intent and Design of them. The Spaniards insisted that a meer Cessation of Hostilities, as stipulated by the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an actual raising of the Siege; and that the Restitution of the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, was not mentioned, or included in them. Besides This, the Court of *Spain* demanded an *Indulto* of 20 per Cent. on the Effects of private Persons, embark'd in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th Article of the *Preliminaries*, as our Politicians and their Advocates interpreted it.

These Points having been warmly litigated by the different Parties, for eight or nine Months, They were adjusted by another Convention, negotiated by the Count de Rothemburg, Minister of *France*, (for We had no Minister at the Court of *Spain*, at that Time) and sign'd at the *Pardo* the 6th of March 1728. This Instrument contained an Explanation of the *Preliminaries*, and it was once more solemnly stipulated * that all the respective PRETENSIONS, on each Side, should be produced, debated and decided in the Congress; with a particular Engagement, that their Britannick and Catho-

† *Defence of the Enquiry*, p 11. * *General Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 182. *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 292.

Catholick Majesties would abide by what should be there regulated.

In the mean Time, it was agreed that the *British* Squadrons should be order'd, without Delay, to withdraw from the Seas of *old* and *new Spain*; in Consideration of which, his *Catholick* Majesty likewise engaged that the Blockade of *Gibraltar* should be immediately raised; that a clear and express Order should be sent, without Delay, for restoring the Ship *Prince Frederick*, with her Cargo, to the Agents of the *South Sea Company*; and that the Effects of the *Flotilla* should be forthwith deliver'd to the respective Proprietors.

These Conditions being accepted, on *both Sides*, his *Catholick* Majesty ratify'd the *Preliminaries*; but before the Ratifications were exchanged, some new Disputes arose, concerning the *Orders*, agreed to be sent to the *West Indies*, in Pursuance of *this Convention*. These fresh Difficulties took up some Time longer; but were likewise got over by the Count *de Rothemburg* and Mr. *Vandermeer*, who managed all our Affairs at the Court of *Spain*, and the *Congress* was opened at *Soissons* on the 3d — 14th of *June* 1728.

This Point being at length obtain'd, after a tedious Course of Negotiation and Expedients, the *ministerial Writers* began to triumph again, as if nothing but the *Form of a Treaty* was wanting to accommodate all our Differences, and establish the publick Tranquility on a lasting Foundation. They gave us the strongest Assurances that all Interruptions to our *Trade* would be effectually removed for the future; that our *plunder'd Merchants* would receive full Satisfaction for their Losses; and that our Right to the Possession of *Gibraltar* was so firmly secured to us, by the *Preliminaries*, and the *Act of Ratification*, that it would not be
so

so much as mentioned in the Congress. These Things, I say, were confidently promised by the *ministerial Writers*, without Doors, and even within Doors by *Those*, who set them to work. But as the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*, could see nothing in either of *these Instruments*, which contained any clear and explicit Engagements upon *these Heads*, They were not quite so sanguine in their Expectations, and the Event more than warranted all their Suspicions. The *Plenipotentiaries* did little more than assemble in Form at *Soissons*, and produce their *Credentials*; after which, having spent five or six Months in *Ceremonies* and *Diversions*, They broke up and separated, without adjusting any one material Point in Dispute.

It is true, indeed, that a certain Plan of Accommodation, called a *Provisional Treaty*, was framed by the Ministers of the *Hanover Allies*, during this Assembly, and sent to the respective Courts for their Approbation; but as this *Draught of a Treaty* was neither relish'd at home, nor accepted abroad, it does not deserve much Notice. I shall only observe, in general, that it was little more than the *Preliminaries* new modelled, and digested into the Form of a *Treaty*, without any specifick Explanation of *those Points*, which most immediately affected the Interests of *Great Britain*.

As to *Gibraltar*, several noble Peers were so far from being satisfy'd that our Right to it was effectually secured by *this Project*, that the following Motion was made in the *House of Lords*; viz. moved to resolve * “ that it is the Opinion of *this House* that, for the Honour of his Majesty, and “ the Preservation and Security of the Trade and “ Commerce of this Kingdom, effectual Care “ should

* *Historical Register*, vol. 14. p. 145.

“ should be taken in the *present Treaty*, that the
 “ King of *Spain* do renounce all Claim and Pre-
 “ tension to *Gibraltar* and the Island of *Minorca*,
 “ in *plain and strong Terms*.” — But after a warm
 Debate, the Question being put thereupon, it was
 carried in the Negative; upon which the *Peers*,
 who made and supported *this Motion*, entered
 their † *Protest*.

A Motion to the same Purpose was afterwards
 made in the *† *House of Commons*; which was
 likewise carried in the Negative, by a great Ma-
 jority.

The *Country Party*, in both Houses, were e-
 qually dissatisfy'd with that Part of the *Provisional*
Treaty, which related to the *Spanish Depredations*;
 and the *Lords* moved to resolve, “ ** that it ap-
 “ pears to *this House* that the Expence of the
 “ Squadron sent to the *West-Indies*, under the
 “ Command of Vice-Admiral *Hofier*, having been
 “ borne by *this Nation* alone, though design'd to
 “ prevent the *Spaniards* from siezing the Effects
 “ belonging to his Majesty's *Allies*, as well as his
 “ *Subjects*, which were on board the *Flota* and
 “ *Galleons*, and from applying the Treasure to
 “ disturb the Peace and invade the Liberties of
 “ *Europe*, hath been an unreasonable Burthen on
 “ *this Kingdom*.” — But this Question was also
 resolved in the Negative, after a long Debate;
 upon which the *Country Lords* entered * *another*
Protest.

If any Persons should be curious to see a more
 particular Account of *this Treaty*, I refer Them
 to a †† *Pamphlet*, published on that Occasion, and
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† *Historical Register*, vol. 14. p. 145.

*† *Ib.* p. 147.

** *Ib.* p. 151.

* *Ib.*

†† *Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, &c.* p. 37.
 printed for Roberts, in the Year 1749.

an *Answer* to it, under the Name of † *Raleigh*.

It will be found, perhaps, that *this Project* served some anniversary Purposes, for which it seemed chiefly to be calculated; but as soon as those Ends were answered, We heard no more of it. The Prospect of an Accommodation immediately vanish'd, and Affairs seem'd to be once more tending to a Rupture. Military Preparations were resumed in all Parts of *Europe*, and particularly in *England*, which is seldom behind Hand, upon such Occasions. A powerful Fleet was fitted out with the utmost Expedition, and made a gallant Appearance at *Spithead*, under the Command of Sir *Charles Wager*. It was there join'd by a Squadron of *Dutch Ships* of War, and seem'd to portend some Enterprize of great Importance; but it afterwards appeared that the *Dutch Squadron* was neither *vitualled*, nor otherwise *provided*, for any Expedition, and the Admiral Himself declared that He had no Orders to attend the *English Fleet* any farther. Having therefore kept us Company for some Months and participated in our *naval Diversions*, They sail'd back to *Holland*, and our own Ships soon after return'd to their respective Harbours.

We were told, indeed, that this PROVISIONAL FLEET, as it was then call'd, struck such a Terror into the Hearts of our Enemies, that We soon *† “ heard of their making Advances, coming into Concessions, abating in their Demands, removing Obstacles, giving agreeable Assurances, and doing the utmost could be expected to
“ shew

† *Craftsman*, vol. 4. p. 239.

*† *The London Journal*, of Oct. 1729. or the *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 173.

“ shew their Inclination to renew the antient Amity subsisting between the two Crowns.” Nay, it was strongly insinuated, in the same Paper, that the Preservation of *Jamaica*, as well as our own *Coasts* from an Invasion, the *Sovereignty of the Seas*, the Freedom of our *Commerce*, and even the Security of our present *Establishment*, were owing to this formidable *Armada*, which frightened our Enemies out of their Designs, and at last produced the glorious Treaty of *Seville*.

But here it deserves a short Remark that during these Exploits at *Spithead*, a * *DAUPHIN* was born in *France*, which broke the *Spanish* Faction in that Kingdom, and had certainly some Influence on the Court of *Spain*, if They could want any Motives to accept of Terms so advantageous to Them as were stipulated by that Treaty.

Thus far the State of our Affairs was, in some Measure, brought down about four Years ago in a † *little Piece*, occasioned by the Publication of the Treaty before-mentioned, and some †† *Observations* upon it. This gave Rise to new Disputes, of which I am now to give some Account.

It cannot be thought wonderful that the *Court Writers* and their *Patrons*, who triumph'd so much the Year before on the *meer Project*, or *Draught of a Treaty*, should discover the same Spirit of Exultation upon procuring a *formal Treaty*, actually sign'd, which the *† *Writer* before me observes is *beyond the Reach of the most artful Malice*; though there was still wanting the Accession of *one Power*, whose Consent was most necessary to the putting it

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* *Craftsman*. vol. 5. P. 177.

† *A short View of the State of Affairs*, &c. since published in the *Craftsman*, vol. 5. P. 345.

†† *Observations upon the Treaty concluded at Seville*, &c. Printed for Roberts in the same Year. *† *Id.* P. 7.

in Execution; for as the Introduction of 6000 *Spanish* Forces into the strong Places of *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, instead of 6000 *Neutrals* stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, was the Basis of the *Seville Treaty*, the Concurrence of the *Emperor*, to whom the *Feodality* of those States belong'd, was certainly requisite to the amicable Execution of it, according to the Doctrine of the *Enquiry* itself, where it is asserted †† that HE ALONE was capable of disturbing it. And yet He was not so much as complimented, in the *Treaty*, with an Invitation to accede, as the *Dutch* again were by an express Article.

It was therefore thought expedient to usher *this Treaty* into the World with some explanatory *Observations* upon it. They could not help foreseeing that their own Arguments upon *this Subject* were capable of being turned very strongly against Them. They knew very well that the *Author* of the *Enquiry* had been instructed, but three Years before, to alarm the *British Nation* with the formidable Projects, in Favour of † *Don Carlos*, even so far as *universal Monarchy*. They could not forget that the *Author* of the * *British Journal*, (who now makes so shining a Figure in the *Free Briton*) but a few Months before represented the Establishment of *this Prince* in *Italy* as a Point of such dangerous Consequence, that it was opposed, at the Congresses of *Cambray* and *Soissons*, by all the principal Powers of *Europe*; particularly *Great Britain*;

“ Since, if *Don Carlos* should ever succeed to
 “ *Tuscany*, *LEGHORN* the Mart of our *Mediterranean-Trade*, will be in his Possession; and
 “ consequently *Spain* will have Power, at any Time,
 “ to

†† *Enquiry*. p. 9.

† *Id.* p. 22. 28. 86.

* See the *British Journal* of *Jan. 4*, 1728-9; or the *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 20.

“ to deprive us of Commerce in the *Levant*, as well as the *West Indies*.

“ In which Case, *says He*, it will be nearly the same, as if We give up *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon*; because those Places will be of little Service to our *Mediterranean* Commerce, when the Marts of that Trade shall intirely exclude us from all Traffick.

This, I say, was the Doctrine advanced by the Author of the *British Journal*, in the Month of *January*, 1728-9; and maintain'd, in another Place, by an *eminent Statesman*, who had the Honour of conducting our foreign Negotiations for several Years together; but a new Turn of Affairs, a few Months afterwards, laid Them under a Necessity of recanting these Arguments in the fullest Manner, and extolling that *very Succession*, which They had so lately condemn'd, as a * *Masterpiece of Politicks*, and one of the best good Fortunes, which could befall this Nation.

However, such glaring Contradictions from the same Mouths, and in so short a Course of Time, were thought to require some farther Apology, before the *Parliament* met. It was upon this Occasion, that the *Observations* were published, and dispersed through the Kingdom by *Authority*, as I remember.—Now, the principal Arguments in this Piece are reducible to the following Heads;

First, † “ That *Great Britain* will be a considerable Gainer by this Variation, as We are freed from the Engagement We were before under, of paying one third Part of the Expence, which would have been requisite for maintain-
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* The *British Journal* sign'd *Thomas Potts*, publish'd in Aug. 1729; or the *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 101.

† *Observations*, p. 12.

ing *neutral Garrisons* in the *Dutchies of Tuscany and Parma*.

Secondly, * " That had the Succession to *Tuscany and Parma* been left open, all *Italy*, considering the Strength of the *Emperor* in that Country, must have probably fallen into his Hands, or at least into such Hands as must have had an entire Dependance on Him; with some very severe Reflections on his *Imperial Majesty*, as a Prince, " who had made but ill Returns of Gratitude to *this Nation*, for having already contributed to his Grandeur in that Part of the World.

And thirdly, " † That the *Emperor* cannot reasonably take Offence at *this Stipulation*, being Himself under previous Engagements, by the *Quadruple Alliance*, to make the Succession of *Don Carlos* effectual. — Neither can the *Variation*, made by the *present Treaty*, of *Spanish* instead of *Swiss Garrisons*, justify, in Reason and good Sense, his *Imperial Majesty's* not consenting to it, unless He can shew that He may be prejudiced by *that Alteration*.

To the *first* of these Arguments it was readily answer'd, * † that the Charge of maintaining 2000 Men in *Italy*, for some Time, ought not to be put in Ballance against the Dangers We should run of involving our selves in a War, by undertaking to effectuate the Introduction of *Spanish* Troops, and to guaranty this Succession for ever, † † so that it may rest secure and exempt from ALL EVENTS.

— It might have been added, that this Plea of *Frugality* was somewhat improperly urged at a Time, when the Nation was at the Expence of main-

* *Observations*, p. 9.

† *Id.* p. 10.

* † *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 266,

† † See the *Treaty*, Art. 9, 10, 11, 12.

maintaining so many numerous Bodies of Men, both Abroad and at Home, without the same Reason.

The *second Argument* is built on the formidable Power of the *Emperor*, which was the fashionable Doctrine at that Time; and from thence it was argued that *this Variation* was necessary to prevent his over-running all *Italy*. In Answer to This it was observed by the Gentlemen, on the *other Side*, * that if his *Imperial Majesty* was really so strong in *those Parts* as He was represented, He would be able to give such an Opposition to the Execution of the *Treaty*, as would plunge us in the greatest Difficulties. But They went farther, and desired to take the contrary of This for granted.—

† “ Let us suppose (*says one of these Writers*) “ that the Introduction and Establishment of the “ Spaniards in *Italy* should be made with so “ superior a Power, that the *Emperor* and *Princes* concern’d are forc’d to submit upon our “ Terms, instead of making *their own*; will the “ Difficulties be all removed? Will all the Inconveniences to *Great Britain*, with which *this Treaty* may be attended, vanish away? They “ certainly will not. Our Measures are so wisely “ taken, that the easiest and shortest Manner of “ effectuating them is likewise the easiest and shortest Way to render the little *We have stipulated* “ for our selves precarious.

But, *thirdly*, though the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* was recommended, under the last Article, as a necessary Expedient to curb the *Emperor's* exorbitant Power; yet We were likewise told, a little paradoxically, that He could not reasonably take Offence at it; nor justify his not consenting to it; unless

* *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 265. 289.

† *Ib.* 293.

unless He could shew that He might be prejudiced by that Alteration. Now this very Concession, as the Country Gentlemen observed, was in Effect giving up the whole Cause; since his Imperial Majesty might easily shew that He should be prejudiced by such an Alteration; and here, indeed, lies the whole Stress of the Argument upon this Point.

It was allow'd, on the Country Side, that the Emperor was a Party in the *Quadruple Alliance*, which establish'd this Succession, and had thereby engaged to make it effectual. But They could not agree with the *Observer* and his Patrons, concerning the Variation in Dispute, for several Reasons, which I will sum up in as few Words as possible.

In the first Place, They apprehended that supposing this Alteration not to be prejudicial to the Interests of his Imperial Majesty; yet that the * Manner of making it, without his Consent, and by Way of Triumph over Him, as a great Fetch in Politicks, would be thought a Reflection upon his Honour, at least, and might be attended with fatal Consequences.

But They likewise undertook to prove that the Introduction of Spanish Troops would be really prejudicial both to the Emperor and the Empire, even according to the *Observer's* Method of Reasoning; for He plainly intimated that one Design of the *Seville Treaty* was to restrain the Emperor's Power in Italy; and consequently it was his Interest to defeat that Design, however it might be the Interest of others to put it in Execution.

This avow'd End of the *Seville Treaty* was aggravated by another, which was likewise cry'd up by the ministerial Writers as a Masterpiece of Politics; I mean the Separation of Spain from the Emperor

Emperor, and thereby dissolving the *Vienna Alliance*, which had been represented so very advantageous to the *latter*. Did not This affect the Interest of his *Imperial Majesty*; or could it be reasonably expected that He would not resent it?

Nay, They went still farther, and I think demonstrated that the Variation from *Neutral* to *Spanish Troops* (without insisting on the *Affront*, or having any Regard to the *Vienna Alliance*) was highly prejudicial both to the Emperor and the Empire; for the *neutral Troops*, stipulated by the *Quadruple Alliance*, were designed not only to secure the † *eventual Succession* of Don Carlos, but likewise the *Rights of Sovereignty established in the* EMPEROR and EMPIRE *over these States*. Now this Part of the Condition was intirely revers'd by the *Variation* in Dispute; and the *Observer's* Argument, upon this Head, was of Course reduced to the following Absurdity; * “that when a *mutual Security* is given and accepted by *two Parties*, for making good a Bargain, this Security “may be taken from *one of the Parties* against his “Consent, and the Benefit of it be wholly applied to the *other*, and yet no Prejudice be done “to the *former*.

To This it was added, by the Writers on the *Country Side*, that his *Imperial Majesty* appeared very plainly to look upon the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* in this Light, by refusing to consent to it, whilst He was under so beneficial an Alliance with *Spain*, and *† even suffering Himself to be disinited from *that Crown* rather than comply, His Reason for This was very obvious; since if the Court of *Spain* had no other Design than to secure the

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 57. *Croftman*, vol. 5. p. 285. * 16. 287. *† *Croftman*, vol. 5. p. 264.

the Dutchies of *Tuscany* and *Parma* for *Don Carlos*, according to the *Quadruple Alliance*, it is certain that *neutral Troops* would have been effectual for that Purpose; nay, more effectual than *Spanish Troops*, if We may believe the *Enquiry*, where the † NEUTRAL GARRISONS, appointed by the *Quadruple Alliance*, are call'd the great *Bulwarks of the Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany*; but their resolute Perseverance in desiring and insisting on *Spanish Garrisons* gave his *Imperial Majesty* just Grounds to apprehend some farther View; and one of the Writers on the *Country Side* seems to be pretty right in his Conjectures, upon this Occasion.

* “ We all know, says He, how precious the Possessions of *Italy* are to the *Imperialists*; how much the Point, to which They are arrived in that Country, of Dominion, Power, and Influence, hath been always the chief Object of their Policy, — Now will it be at all strange, if They look on the *Variation* made in the *Quadruple Alliance* as a Measure taken to give Them a *Rival in that Country*, where They are at present indisputably the *superior Power*? Will not these Garrisons of *Spaniards*, pretended to be placed there for the Security of the eventual Succession of *Dou Carlos*, make Them look on *Parma*, *Placentia*, *Portoferraio*, and *Leghorn*, as so many Places of Arms, put into the Hands of an *old Enemy*, an *unfaithful Ally*, and a *certain Rival*? May They not apprehend that neither Pretences, nor Means will be wanting, if the Treaty of *Seville* hath its Effect, to introduce greater Numbers of *Spanish*, and even *French Troops* into the Heart of *Italy*, and to
“ serve

† *Enquiry*, p. 45.

* *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 288.

“ serve the *Emperor* as *Ferdinand the Catholick*
 “ served *Lewis the 12th*, in Consequence of the
 “ silly Partition, to which the *latter* consented.

In another Piece, the Consequences of the *Seville Treaty* are farther explained and foretold.

† “ It is said, that *France* and *England* are
 “ Guaranties for the *Emperor's* Dominions in *Italy*
 “ against any Encroachments, which *Spain* may
 “ attempt to make upon them.

“ I answer, that the Purposes of the *Quadruple*
 “ *Alliance* would have been effectually secured by
 “ *neutral Troops* ; but it is extremely probable that
 “ the Introduction of *Spaniards* will be followed
 “ by Invasions on the *Emperor's* Dominions ; for
 “ though the Introduction of only 6000 *Spaniards*
 “ is stipulated, yet if They are put in Possession
 “ of *Leghorn*, They may admit as many more as
 “ They please by the Help of their *Fleet*, which
 “ is large enough for that Purpose, and will be
 “ as good as a Bridge between *Italy* and *Spain*,
 “ In this Case, *France* will not be very forward to
 “ execute their Engagements of Guaranty in the
 “ *Emperor's* Behalf ; and if *England* does, she
 “ must lose her Trade to *Spain* and *Leghorn*. If
 “ *France* should think fit to quarrel with the *Em-*
 “ *peror*, They would encourage *Spain* to invade his
 “ *Italian* Dominions ; and when the *Emperor* com-
 “ plains of it, They will, without much Difficulty,
 “ (according to the modern Way of interpreting
 “ the Obligations of Treaties) find out some Act
 “ or other of the *Emperor*, which They will al-
 “ ledge as a Reason for his having forfeited a
 “ Right to that Guaranty.

Upon the whole, it was concluded by these Wri-
 ters that his *Imperial Majesty* would not consent to
 F the

† The Case of the *Hessian Forces*, &c. since published in
 the *Craftsman*, vol. 6. p. 311.

the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons*, unless He should be bought into it by † *another Expedient*, which might prove equally productive of bad Consequences; I mean our Guaranty of the PRAG-MATICK SANCTION.

They likewise observed, with too much Reason, that as the Reconciliation of *Spain* and the *Emperor*, by the *first Vienna Treaty*, was the luckiest Circumstance, which could possibly happen to us at that Time, and ought to have excited our Joy, instead of alarming us with such a terrible Panick; so They apprehended * *that the Separation of those two Courts would be followed by a new Union between France and Spain more formidable to Us than That, which We had dissolv'd.*

We were told, indeed, *† *that if Spain should presume to break the Bounds of Power in Italy, there are formidable Princes will rise in Opposition; perhaps OUR SELVES.* But to This it was answer'd, that besides the ridiculous Employment of being always *doing and undoing*, *France* might recover so much Strength, and the *Emperor* be so far reduced by *these Measures*, that it would not be in our Power to set Matters upon their right Foot again. Upon this Supposition, *one of the Writers on the Country Side* made the following Observation, which deserves particular Attention at this Time.

†† “ If the whole Weight of national Vengeance is ever to fall, it ought surely to crush
 “ *Those*, who precipitate their Country, by a long
 “ Series of Blanders and Mistakes, into such a
 “ terrible *Dilemma*, that We cannot observe our
 “ *Treaties*, without being exposed to fight against
 our

† *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 292.

* *Craftsman*, vol. 6. p. 308.

*† *British Journals of Aug. 1729, or the Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 100.

†† *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 291.

“ our *general Interests*, and without finding, when
 “ We return to them, that the *Weakness* of our
 “ *Allies* and the *Strength* of our *Enemies* are the
 “ Works of our *own Hands*.

I believe This will be thought sufficient to explain the Reasonings on *both Sides*, concerning the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Italy*, † *which made one of the principal Stipulations of the new Treaty*, as the *Observer* very frankly acknowledg’d. But it was natural to enquire what Terms We had obtained for *our selves*, in Return for such valuable Obligations on the Court of *Spain*.

To satisfy this just Expectation, We were assured by the *Observer* * “ that our *Possessions*
 “ *abroad* were secured to us, beyond all Possibility of Doubt, or Cavi; that all our Privileges
 “ and Advantages in *Commerce* were re-established
 “ upon the Foot of former Treaties; and that
 “ immediate Reparation was stipulated to our
 “ *Merchants* for all the Damages They had suffered
 “ at any Time, contrary to the Treaties of
 “ *Utrecht*, or any other Treaties, which subsisted
 “ between *England* and *Spain* to that very Day.

But the *Writers on the other Side* could not find any Articles, or Words in the *Treaty*, which could be fairly interpreted so as to justify these Assurances, or to deserve those Encomiums, which were bestowed upon it.

They observed that the *Spaniards* were so far from having renounc’d their Pretensions to *Gibraltar*, or recogniz’d our Right to the Possession of it, that it is not so much as mentioned through the whole Treaty; and it hath been since confess’d by an *honourable Gentleman*, in an high Station, *† *that if We had offer’d to mention any*

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Thing

† *Observations on the Treaty of Seville*, p. 8.
 &c. *† *Craftsman*, vol. 6. p. 38.

* *Id.* p. 14.

Thing about Gibraltar, the Spaniards would have broke off all farther Negotiations. We were likewise told by one of his Advocates, that Gibraltar was an old Sore, and that our Ministers were desirous to touch it tenderly; That is, the Court of Spain would not admit of any Words in the Treaty, which would annihilate their Pretensions, and did not design to include our Possession of that Place in their general Guaranty of all his Majesty's Kingdoms, States and Dominions. How therefore could it be said with Truth, as the Observer affirm'd, that We had a very full Acknowledgment, on the Part of Spain, of our Right to Gibraltar and the Island of Minorca; or that those Possessions were secured to us, beyond all Possibility of Doubt, or Cavil; when We had obtained no other Security for Them, than what was before complained of in the Preliminaries, the Convention of the Pardo, and the Provisional Treaty? I mean, a Confirmation of all former Treaties, and consequently That of Madrid in the Year 1721, upon which the Spaniards ground their Claim to the Restitution of Gibraltar?

*They likewise apprehended that the Provisions made in this Treaty for the future Security of our Commerce, and Reparation to our Merchants for their past Sufferings, would prove ineffectual. These Provisions were, that * Commissaries should be appointed on the Part of their Britannick and Catholick Majesties, who should assemble at the Court of Spain, to examine and decide all Differences upon these Heads; with an express Stipulation, that They should punctually finish their Commission within the Space of three Years from the Day of signing the present Treaty, without any farther Delay, on any Motive, or Pretext whatever.*

It

It was apprehended, I say, on the *Country Side*, that these Provisions would be very liable to Evasion, by the *Distance of Place*, where the *Commissaries* were to meet, the *Length of Time*, allow'd for this Enquiry, and the several Points, of which it was to consist; particularly * “ the Pretensions of “ his *Catholick Majesty* to the Restitution of the “ Ships taken in the *Mediterranean*, in the Year “ 1718; an Article, which may be so cast up by “ the *Spanish Commissaries* as to overballance the “ Account of the *British Merchants*, by several “ hundred thousand Pounds.

On the *other Side* it was asserted, that “ † the “ Restitution of our Losses since *June 1727* was “ to be *immediate* and *forthwith*, as well as the Introduction of the *Spanish Garrisons* was to be “ *without Loss of Time*; and that the Affair of “ the *Merchants* stood *PRIOR* in the Treaty to “ the *Tuscan Affair*, and, so far as it was to be “ *without Loss of Time*, must have the Preference; “ nay, if it was not performed *immediately*, nothing was obliged to be done in Favour of *Don Carlos*.

Indeed, it was reasonable enough to expect that the *Spaniards* should have been obliged to make our *Merchants* Reparation for their Losses, before We gratify'd Them in so favourite a Point as the Introduction of *Don Carlos*. But though the Article of *Reparation* happened to stand *prior* in the Treaty to the *Tuscan Affair*, as *this Writer* most sagely observed, yet the Adjudication of the *former* being left to *Commissaries*, who had *three Years* allowed to finish their Enquiry, and the *latter* being to be effectuated *without Loss of Time*, it
was

* *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 270.

† The *Free-Briton* extraordinary, in Answer to the *Short View*; printed for *Peale*, in the Year 1730, p. 45.

was easy to perceive which would have the Preference ; and This furnished one Objection, of no small Weight, against the *Treaty* itself ; in which
 † “ We seem’d to make just such a *Bargain*, as
 “ We made in the *Quadruple Alliance* ; when We
 “ put *Sicily*, and all that the *Emperor* had to expect from our *Friendship*, into his Hands immediately ; although the reciprocal Part, to be performed by *Him*, was to be a Work of Time ;
 “ and although We had not received Satisfaction from *Him* in *some Points*, about which We were
 “ extremely solicitous.

These Reasonings without Doors, concerning the *Treaty of Seville*, had likewise the Honour to be strengthened by the Arguments of several noble Lords and Gentlemen of great Distinction, within Doors ; particularly in the *House of Peers*, where the following Motions were made ; viz.

Die Martis 27 Jan. 1729.

Moved to resolve * “ that the Agreement in
 “ the *Treaty of Seville* to effectuate the Introduction of *Spanish Troops* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*,
 “ is a manifest Violation of the fifth Article of
 “ the *Quadruple Alliance*, tends to involve the
 “ Nation in a dangerous and expensive War, and
 “ to destroy the Ballance of Power in *Europe*.

“ *After Debate, the Question was put upon the said Motion, and it was resolved in the Negative.*

Moved to resolve “ that our Right of Sovereignty, Dominion, Possession and Propriety to
 “ *Gibraltar*, and the Island of *Minorca*, is not ascertain’d by the *Treaty of Seville*, so as to extinguish the Claims and Pretensions set up by
 “ the *Spaniards*, which were followed by an actual
 “ tual

† *Craftsman*, vol. 5. p. 293.

* *Hist. Register*, vol. 15, p. 202.

" tual Siege, since the Cession of those valuable
 " Places by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereon,*
 " *and resolved in the Negative.*

Moved to resolve " that the Stipulations in the
 " Treaty of *Seville*, for repairing the Losses of
 " our *Merchants*, are insufficient and precarious.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereupon,*
 " *and it was resolved in the Negative.*

Then it was proposed, by some *other Lords*, to
 resolve " that the Treaty of Peace, Union and
 " Friendship, concluded at *Seville* the 9th of No-
 " vember last, doth contain all necessary Stipula-
 " tions for maintaining and securing the *Honour*,
 " *Dignity, Rights, and Possessions of the Crown*;
 " and that all due Care is taken therein for the
 " Support of the *Trade* of the Kingdom, and for
 " repairing the Losses suffered by the *Merchants*.

" *After Debate, the Question was put thereupon,*
 " *and it was resolved in the Affirmative; upon*
 " *which several Lords entered their* Protest against*
 " *it, with their Reasons at large, which deserve par-*
 " *ticular Notice at this Time.*

I shall now proceed, according to the Method
 proposed, to a few short Remarks on the Effects
 of *this Treaty*.

In the first Place, it is observable that his *Impe-*
rial Majesty was so far from looking on the In-
 troduction of *Spanish* Garrisons into *Tuscany* and
Parma as a trifling Variation from the *Quadruple*
Alliance, according to the Doctrine of the *Court*
Writers, that He resented both the *Matter* and the
Manner of it in the strongest Terms, as a down-
 right *Infraction of Treaties*, derogatory to his *Ho-*
nour, and injurious to his *Interests*, as well as the
 Rights

Rights of the *Empire*. He ordered his *Ministers* at several Courts to remonstrate against it as such; and sent a † *Commissorial Decree* to the Diet at *Ratisbon*; in which, having vindicated his own Conduct to the *States of the Empire*, there assembled, with Relation to *Don Carlos*, He speaks of the *present Stipulation* in the following Manner. —

“ But contrary to all Expectation, a particular
 “ Treaty hath been concluded at *Seville*, between
 “ the Crowns of *Spain, France, and Great Britain*;
 “ the 9th and subsequent Articles of which (*rela-*
 “ *ting to the Spanish Garrisons*) cannot but raise
 “ the highest Indignation; because the most essen-
 “ tial Bands of human Society are therein broken,
 “ and if *Christian Powers* pretend thus to dispose
 “ of the Estates of *third Persons*, all Confidence
 “ and good Faith ought to be banished out of
 “ the World. Besides, They have no Regard to
 “ former *Treaties*, nor to the last *Preliminary Ar-*
 “ *ticles*, which were acknowledged by *both Parties*
 “ as the Groundwork of the Negotiations for the
 “ general Peace, and as the only Counterpoise to
 “ an exorbitant Power, that was design’d to be e-
 “ rected in *Europe*. They have no Attention to the
 “ *Acts of Guaranty*, that have been delivered. They
 “ dispose of the Rights and Territories of the *Em-*
 “ *pire* as They please, even in the Life-time of
 “ the *lawful Possessors*. They set so little a Value
 “ upon the *Emperor and Empire*, that They would
 “ not so much as ask their *Consent* in an Affair,
 “ that was properly their own, though *such Consent*
 “ was made necessary by the Alliance of *London*.
 “ —If therefore *such Conduct* takes Place, and the
 “ *new Allies* persist therein, We shall hereafter see
 “ *Might* overcome *Right*, and *Engagements* tram-
 “ pled

† *Historical Register*, vol. 15. p. 134.

“pled on at Pleasure; and whatever the *new Allies*
 “shall judge to be most convenient will always be
 “most just, without any Regard to *Things*, or
 “*Persons*.

His *Imperial Majesty* likewise represents to the
Germanick Body, as a Merit to Himself, * “that
 “the Fear of being abandon’d by his Ally, the
 “King of *Spain*, was not capable of making Him
 “take the least Step, that could prejudice *his Dignity*,
 “and That of the *Empire*.

The Court of *Vienna* did not content Them-
 selves, like some *other Politicians*, with shewing
 their Resentments in *Words* and *Appearances* only;
 but actually pour’d a large Army into *Italy* with
 Orders to oppose the Execution of the *Treaty*, and
 found Means to maintain Them there all the fol-
 lowing Summer, notwithstanding the Suggestions
 of the *Court-Party*, and the wise Precautions We
 took, by an † *Act of Parliament*, to prevent the
 Subjects of this Kingdom from lending Him any
 Money.

When the Allies of *Seville* found the *Emperor* in
 Earnest, and fully determined to stand upon his
 Defence, They began to halt and beat a Parley.
 The Cabinets of *Europe* were again employed in
 framing *Expedients*; Couriers were continually pas-
 sing from Court to Court; and the publick Prints
 amus’d us with nothing but new Plans, or new Re-
 ports of Accommodation; whilst a large *Fleet* lay
 in the Road of *Barcelona*, and a numerous Body
 of *Land Forces* were assembled on the neighbour-
 ing Coasts, ready to embark upon the first Notice
 for the intended Expedition. But his *Imperial Ma-*

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jesty

* *Ib.*

† See an Act, to prohibit his Majesty’s Subjects, to lend any
 Sums of Money to any foreign Prince, State, or Potentate, &c.
 in the Year 1739.

jeſty having rejected all the Propoſitions made to Him, for acceding to the Treaty of *Seville*, and ſeeming determin'd to abide Extremities, rather than conſent to their Meaſures; that Summer wore out in Negotiation only, and the *Spaniſh Armada* retired to their Harbours, without any Action, like our Fleet at *Spithead*, the Year before.

The Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spaniſh* Troops into *Italy* being thus protracted; the Performance of the Articles, in our Favour, was likewiſe ſuſpended. The *Spaniards* not only continued the Blockade of *Gibraltar*, in the moſt rigorous Manner, ſo as to cut off all Communication with the Country; but likewiſe projected ſome *new Works* for annoying our Ships in the Bay, which have been ſince finiſhed. Inſtead of making our *Merchants* any *immediate Reparation*, by Virtue of that *Priority* in the Treaty, which the *Court-Writers* diſcovered, They did not ſo much as nominate *Commiſſaries*, on their Part, for adjusting thoſe Loſſes; and ſeem'd to think Themſelves free from all Engagements towards us, till the Stipulations, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, were effectually put in Execution.

Thus did Affairs continue in a doubtful Situation between *Peace* and *War*, as They had continued for ſeveral Years paſt, till the Season of *Parliament* in *Great Britain* came round again; That is, till the Beginning of the Year 1731; about which Time, a private Negotiation at *Vienna*, between *Great Britain* and the *Emperor*, began to get Air, and was firſt hinted to the Publick in the famous H A G U E L E T T E R, printed in the * *Craftſman*; which, having ſince received a *judicial Censure*, I am not at Liberty to quote, tho' it

* *Craftſman*, No. 235. Sat. Jan. 2, 1730-1.

it would be of great Use to my present Purpose; but as it was chiefly built on the 4th Article of the *Hanover Treaty*, and the bad Consequences, which might attend any *Breach* of it, I must content my self with laying *that Article* before the Reader. It runs in the following Terms, *viz.*

† “ And as the said *three most serene Kings* are
 “ are resolved to bind more and more closely the
 “ strict Union, that subsists amongst Them, by all
 “ possible Tokens of *good Faith* and *mutual Con-*
 “ *fidence*, They have reciprocally agreed, not only
 “ to enter into *no Treaty, Alliance, or Engagement*
 “ whatever, which may in any Manner whatever
 “ be contrary to the *Interests of each other*; but even
 “ faithfully to *communicate to each other the Propo-*
 “ *sals, that may be made to Them*, and not to take,
 “ upon what may be proposed, any *Resolution*, o-
 “ therwise than in *Concert together*, and after a *joint*
 “ *Examination* of what may conduce to their *com-*
 “ *mon Interests*, and be proper for maintaining the
 “ Ballance of *Europe*, which is so necessary to be
 “ preserved for the Good of the *general Peace*.

In less than three Months after the *Hague Letter* was published, a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was actually concluded at *Vienna* between the *Emperor* and the King of *Great Britain*, in which the *States General* were likewise included; but neither *France*, nor *Spain* were so much as mentioned in it; which seem'd to be somewhat extraordinary as to the latter, at least, since the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Italy*, with the *Emperor's* Consent, made one of the principal Stipulations of this *new Treaty*; nay, what is still more surprizing, it was with extreme Difficulty that They were brought into it at last, and even then not without insisting on several Alterations in the *Act of Appro-*
 G 2 *bation*

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. 4. p. 149. *Grosman*, vol. 7, p. 223.

bation; one of which, if I do not forget, was that the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with 6000 *Spanish* Troops into *Italy* should be effectuated PREVIOUSLY to the Execution of any Engagements on their Part, however They might stand PRIOR in the Treaty of *Seville*; which, by the Way, was concluded above a Year and an half before. The *Dutch* were still more backward in their Accession, and did not accede at last without some * wise Restrictions. As for the Court of *France*, They were so far from listening to any Sollicitations on this Head, that They exerted their utmost Endeavours to prevent the Concurrence of *Spain*. Nay, They express'd such a Resentment both against the Treaty itself, and the Manner of negotiating it, that We apprehended nothing leis than an Invasion from *Dunkirk*, where some Troops were assembled. This struck us, all on a Sudden, with such a Terror, that the Coasts of *Kent* were immediately cover'd with Regiments of Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, who were order'd to march thither, with the utmost Precipitation, from all Parts of the Kingdom; and the Fluctuation, which such an Alarm naturally occasion'd in our Stocks, afforded the Caterpillars of the *Alley* a plentiful Harvest.

However, these Apprehensions being soon dissipated, Sir *Charles Wager* was again dispatch'd to the Coasts of *Spain* with a large Squadron of *English* Ships, in order to wait upon *Don Carlos* and the *Spanish* Troops to his new Dominions. The Admiral Ship was fitted out in a most splendid and costly Manner, for the Reception of his serene Highness; but after a Course of pompous Compliments and Visits between the Commander of the *Spanish Fleet* and our Admiral, upon his Arrival at
Cadiz,

Cádiz, and the same Honours having been afterwards paid Him at the Court of *Seville*, his *Catholic Majesty* was pleased to discharge Him from the Trouble of taking *Don Carlos* under his Care, and required no more at his Hands than to convey the *Spanish Troops* to *Italy*, in Conjunction with his own *Admiral*. The combin'd Fleet accordingly set sail from *Barcelona* in *October* 1731, and arrived at *Leghorn* the 26th of that Month.

As soon as the Court of *Spain* received Intelligence that their Forces were safely landed, and that * every Thing, relating to the Introduction of Spanish Garrisons in *Tuscany* was finished; the young Prince was sent after them by Land, as far as *Antibes*; for They chose to let Him travel thro' *France*, rather than accept of those magnificent Accommodations, which had been provided for Him and his Retinue on Board our Squadron, at so great an Expence. His Highness arrived at † *Leghorn* the 27th of *Dec.* following, and was received there with all possible Marks of Joy and Respect; especially by the *English Factory*, who erected a triumphal Arch in Honour of the Day. Soon after This, his Majesty received a Letter from the Dutchess Dowager of *Parma*, Guardian to *Don Carlos*, wherein †† she acquaints his Majesty with the due and happy Accomplishment of that Succession, desiring his Majesty's Acceptance of a *† MEDAL struck upon this Occasion, and expressing her Sense of his Majesty's Friendship to the Royal, Infante Duke, as well as to Himself; and of the great

* See the *London Gazettes* for the Month of *Nov.* 1731.

† *London Gazette*, *Jan* 1st. 1731-2.

†† See the *publick Papers* of the same Date.

*† It was said that this Medal contain'd the Effigies of *Don Carlos* on one Side, with this Inscription; *Carolus I. Borbonius-Farnesius, novus Dux PARMÆ & PLACENTIAE*; and on the Reverse, a royal Crown upon a Carpet, with this Device; *MOX VENIET.*

great Share, that his Majesty hath had in this
IMPORTANT EVENT.

About the same Time, Admiral *Wager* received a Present of the King of *Spain's* Picture set with Diamonds, to a great Value, for his Services in that glorious Expedition.

Don Carlos being thus established in his new Dominions, to the Satisfaction of their *Catholick Majesties*, and at our Expence, the ministerial Writers began to raise their Crests again, and promised us all, that our Hearts could wish from the Court of *Spain*, in Return for such high Obligations. — But before I proceed to the Effects of these Transactions, I must make a few Remarks on another Article of the *Vienna Treaty*.

For as the *Emperor* consented to this Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons* into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, which He seem'd so resolutely determin'd to oppose with all his Might but a Year before; it must be concluded, that He likewise obtained some favourite Point for Himself; and That was our *Guaranty of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION*; the very Point, which was mark'd out and foretold by the *Country Writers* as the only Term, upon which We should be able to purchase the Accession of his *Imperial Majesty* to the Treaty of *Seville*. This was just hinted at before; but I must now beg Leave to cite the *Passage* at large, with the *Author's* Sentiments upon such an Expedient.

† “ But it will be said, perhaps, that We are
“ brought into no Danger of a War with the *Em-*
“ *peror*; that our wise Ministers have a Reserve
“ still in their Power, and can make a Peace with
“ his *Imperial Majesty*, whenever They please; that
“ to effect it, nothing more will be necessary than
“ to

“ to give *our Guaranty* to the Disposition, whatever it be, which his Imperial Majesty hath made, or shall make of the *Austrian Dominions*.

“ Such an *Expedient* as This would, I doubt not, be soon pass’d (if the immediate Danger of a War press’d upon us) by *Those*, who think of nothing more than how to get over, by *annual Expedients*, the *annual Difficulties* They bring Themselves under; without any Regard to the continual Charge and frequent Losses, which the Nation is obliged to support, by their Management, or to the dangerous Consequences of their Measures. But Men, who think on wiser and honest Principles, would look on *such a Guaranty* as a Method of Cure very little preferable to the Disease it self.

“ His *Imperial Majesty* hath indeed given *his Guaranty* to the Succession of our Crown, establish’d in the present, Royal Family; but there would be no Parity between *such a Guaranty* as This, and the *Guaranty of a Succession*, the Nature of which may be known by the *Pragmatick Sanctions*, but the Descent of which into any *particular Family* cannot be foreseen.

“ Who could answer, in this Case, that We might not give *our Guaranty* even to the aggrandizing of *Don Carlos*; which is an Event *our Politicians* have express’d their Apprehensions of in the strongest Terms, although They seem at present a little better reconciled to it?

“ Who could foresee the numberless Mischiefs, of which such a Disposition of the *Austrian Dominions* might be productive, if his *Imperial Majesty* should die without *Issue male*? What Clashing of Interests might there not be, even in the *Imperial Family*, as well as in every Part of the *Empire*? To get clear of a War with *Spain*,
We

“ We expose our selves to a War, which may
 “ commence in *Italy*, and spread much farther.
 “ By the *Expedient*, now supposed, We might get
 “ clear of an immediate War in *Italy*; but We
 “ should stand in Danger of being involved, a lit-
 “ tle sooner, or a little later, in a War, which
 “ may distract *Germany* as much, and last as long
 “ as That of 1618, and kindle its Fires all over
 “ *Europe*.

The *Author of the Enquiry* reason'd, upon the
 same Principles, against our *Guaranty of the Prag-*
matick Sanction, about two Years before, and ap-
 plauded his late Majesty's Wisdom for refusing it,
 in the following Words. “ Certainly, no one can
 “ think but that it was wisely and happily judg'd
 “ to refuse a *Guaranty*, which might have been at-
 “ tended with so fatal Consequences; for as the
 “ *Emperor's* Children are now *Females* only; and
 “ the Influence of that Succession upon *Europe* must
 “ depend upon the Marriages of *these Females*;
 “ and as no one then knew to what *Princes* They
 “ might be hereafter married; it was wise in his
 “ Majesty not to oblige Himself to support a *Suc-*
 “ *cession*, which might possibly, by some future
 “ *Marriages*, become formidable to the rest of
 “ *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* it self.

This was the Language of the *Court*, and the
 Doctrine of the *Enquiry*, at the Beginning of the
 Year 1727, in order to justify the Treaty of *Ha-*
nover, and the Measures, that had been taken against
 the Allies of *Vienna*. I must therefore beg Leave
 to recommend one Consideration to the *Author of*
that memorable Treatise; who seem'd to be very
 angry, about five Years ago, with an Observation,
 † that He had been given up, in every material
Article,

*Article, by BOTH PARTIES, and complain'd of it as groundless. This Complaint, among other Reasons, produced a * Reply from the Gentleman, who made the Observation; and it was generally thought that He supported it very fully, by an Induction of Particulars, as to the main Points then in Dispute; I mean the several Articles of the secret, offensive Treaty of Vienna, which was so strongly asserted in the Enquiry; for it did not then enter into any Body's Imagination, that We should ever consent to the Introduction of SPANISH GARRISONS into Italy, or become Guaranties of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION. But since the Vicissitude of human Affairs, the Fluctuation of Power, and the Revolution of Politicks have brought these Things to pass, I leave the Gentleman to determine, in his own Breast, whether He is not now effectually given up in every material Article, which He either asserted, or justify'd in that Book. I am willing to believe Him a Man of great Sincerity, and that He was led into Error meerly through Misinformation; but since his Book was set forth by Authority, as a Sort of political Canon, which the People were to receive for their Rule of Faith, and hath been made the Foundation of all our Disputes, for several Years together, it certainly behoves Him to review it once more, and compare it with our late Measures, as becomes a candid Writer and a Lover of Truth.— But This is only by Way of Digression. Let us now proceed to other Matters, according to the Method laid down.*

It must be confess'd that this Treaty of Vienna prevented an immediate War, and serv'd to keep Things together for some Time; but it was far from establishing a firm and lasting Peace; for, to speak in the softest Terms, there hath been a remark-

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able Coldness between *Us* and *France* ever since; and the Preparations in the Ports of *Spain* for equipping *another Armament*, the very next Spring, seem'd to give our *Ministers* such an Alarm, that a *Fleet* was fitted out here likewise in a great Hurry, and rendezvouz'd at the *Nore*, where it continued for some Time, under the Command of Sir *George Walton*. This, I say, seem'd to intimate that our *Court* had some Jealousy of the Design of the *Spaniards*; for as soon as certain Intelligence arriv'd that They were landed near *Oran*, the *Admiral* was ordered to strike his Flag, and the Ships return'd to their Harbours.

Immediately after This, the *ministerial Press* was delivered of another Pamphlet, intitled * *the natural Probability of a lasting Peace in Europe*; from whence it is necessary to quote a few Passages.

He begins with telling us that † “ We enjoy at present the *most perfect, universal* and *establis'd Tranquility*. We behold not only *Great Britain* at Peace, and on the most amicable Terms with *all her Neighbours*, but all her Neighbours are at the same Time disposed in the strongest Manner to live *well with each other*. We are not only happy in a good Understanding with *other Nations*, but those Nations likewise are without Quarrels and Disputes *among Themselves*; so that as We have no Prospect of War, or Contention, by *Differences of our own*; neither are We likely to be drawn into Danger by the *Disagreements, the Ruptures, or Commotions of others*.

This, one would think, was sufficient in all Conscience; but He explains our Happiness more particularly in the next Paragraph.

“ This most advantageous Situation, *says He* “

" is what We have very seldom seen, what We
 " hope will long continue, and what We conceive
 " to be secured by the *most effectual, the best con-*
 " *trived Means in the World.* We cannot look back
 " to any particular Period, within a long Course
 " of Time, when *Europe* was blest with *such uni-*
 " *versal Quiet*, and with such reasonable Hopes of
 " its *long extended Duration.* Almost every Peace,
 " that hath been made in *Europe*, since the Resto-
 " ration of *Charles* d, seems to have been in its
 " Nature, as well as in its Consequence, no better
 " than a *short Cessation of Arms*; and whoever
 " looks into the *Treaties*, which were design'd to
 " compose the *Quarrels of Princes* then at Vari-
 " ance, may easily see their *Differences* far from
 " being *finisb'd*, and *those unfinisb'd Differences*
 " big with *new Calamities.* But We have now
 " the Happiness to see the *PLAN OF POWER* so
 " well design'd, the *Limits* so well bounded, and
 " so strongly fenc'd, the several Princes of *Europe*
 " so well satisfy'd with their *respective Conditions*,
 " so powerfully disposed to *live peaceably within*
 " *Themselves*, and so very far from being either
 " interested, or inclined to make *Encroachments on*
 " *their Neighbours*, that We may indulge all those
 " Pleasures, which good Minds are capable of
 " conceiving on so *agreeable a Prospect*; since no
 " Season ever beheld a *Peace more universal*, nor
 " did any Conjunction of Affairs ever promise a
 " *Peace more establisb'd and lasting.*

Some Remarks upon *this Piece* were immedi-
 ately published in the † *Craftsman*; particularly on
 the *NEW PLAN OF POWER*, so highly extoll'd in
 the foregoing Paragraph.

This Writer profess'd Himself ready to acknow-
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lege that “ almost every Peace since the Restoration (*and especially for SEVERAL YEARS PAST*) “ seems to have been in its Nature, as well as in “ its Consequence, no better than a SHORT CESSATION OF ARMS.” He likewise confess’d, “ that the PLAN OF POWER in *Europe* was certainly alter’d by two fundamental Articles of “ our *late Treaties* ; viz. the Introduction of *Don Carlos* into *Italy*, and the Guaranty of the “ *Pragmatick Sanction*.” But He was very far from agreeing with *this Reasoner upon Probabilities*, that it had laid the Foundation of an *universal and establis’d Peace* ; since it was well known that the Court of *France* was so far from discovering any Disposition to guaranty the *Pragmatick Sanction*, that it was undoubtedly their Interest to oppose it ; that They had actually opposed it already, as far as They could do in the Way of *Negotiation* ; and that, in all *Probability*, They would oppose it by *Force*, whenever the Contingency should happen. — He likewise express’d the same Apprehension from the new Settlement of *Don Carlos*, with Regard to the *Tranquility of Europe*, and ask’d the following remarkable Questions upon it. “ May not the “ *ITALIAN DOMINIONS* furnish a Bone of Contention between *Germany* and *Spain*, in Times “ to come, as *Flanders* hath already done between “ *France* and the *States General*? May not these “ *Pretensions* prove the Means of UNITING *France* “ and *Spain*, and involve *Great Britain* in a War “ to support her Engagements?

The *Court Author* beforementioned (That is, Mr. *Walsingham*) was pleased to give these Questions a Reply in his next † *Free Briton*, and treated it as a ridiculous Supposition, “ that *France* “ and

“ and Spain should join in Arms against the *Pragmatic Sanction*. The Interests of *France* and
 “ *Spain* (*says He*) are so far incompatible, in this
 “ Affair, that the *Pope* and the *Turk* might as
 “ well be expected to join in a War for the utter
 “ Subversion of the *Protestant Religion*.

He adds, by Way of Interrogation, † “ if
 “ the Crown of *Spain* had any Claims, any Demands
 “ upon the *Emperor* in *Italy*, can it be
 “ thought that This would unite the *French* and
 “ *Spaniards* together? — Would the Court of
 “ *France* think it worth their Trouble even to
 “ take away Power from the House of *Austria*, if
 “ it were merely to add to the *Spanish* Power?
 “ Or are not the *French* and *Spaniards* naturally
 “ as jealous of each other, as either of Them can
 “ be of the House of *Austria*? — And can it then
 “ be thought that They will ever UNITE, when
 “ their Interests always must be different?

What an excellent Head must *this Man* have to reason upon *Probabilities*, and judge of *future Contingencies*, who seems altogether ignorant of *actual Events*? For it was visible to every Body, of common Discernment, that an *Union* between *France* and *Spain* was very far advanced even at the Time, when He published this *Song of Triumph*; and, indeed, had been growing up ever since the Treaty of *Seville*, which naturally produced it, as the *Country Writers* justly observed, by dissolving the Alliance between *Spain* and the *Emperor*. He likewise seems to have forgot a certain Observation of his old Acquaintance, *ROGER MANLEY Esq*; some Years before, concerning the *Queen of Spain*, viz. * “ that
 “ as she is a Princess of SPIRIT and AMBITION,
 “ she carried her Views yet farther, being very
 “ desirous

† *Ib.* * *British Journal*, Jan. 4th. 1728-9.

“ desirous to make her SON *sole Monarch* of LOM-
 “ BARDY.” Now, if This is the true Cha-
 racter of her *Catholic Majesty*, let me ask our *pro-*
found Politician, whether paving the Way for *Don*
Carlos so far as We have done, could possibly have
 any *natural Tendency* to check her *Ambition*; or
 whether she could take a more *probable Method* of
 gratifying her *farther Views*, than by *uniting with*
FRANCE, on a proper Opportunity? — But I am
 ashamed to comment any farther on a *Piece*, which
 appeared absurd enough of itself, when it was first
 published, and hath been lately ridicul’d in so *
 handsome a Manner. I shall therefore close this
 Head with an Observation or two, which natu-
 rally result from the State of the Case.

The precedent Transactions are sufficient to
 teach us how necessary it is for *Ministers and*
Governors of Kingdoms, which have any *main In-*
terest at Stake, or any *great Point* at Heart,
 to keep it constantly in View, and to pursue it
 with inflexible Resolution. By these Means, We
 see, the Court of *Spain* hath at length effectuated
 the Succession of *Don Carlos* to the *Tuscan Domi-*
nions through infinite Obstacles; and, if We may
 believe the *ministerial Writers*, against the Interests
 and Inclinations of all the Powers in *Europe*. By
 the same Means, his *Imperial Majesty* hath, in a
 Manner, extorted our *Guaranty of the Pragmatick*
Sanction, which his *late* and his *present Majesty*
 thought fit to refuse so long. I sincerely wish that
 I had any Opportunity of congratulating my own
 Country on the same happy Issue of our Negoti-
 ations, with Respect to those *essential Points*, about
 which We have been contending for so many Years,
 and at so much Expence; but though the same
 Assiduity hath, no Doubt, been employed, and the
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* *Fog's Journal*, Dec. 22, 1733.

same constant, invariable Regard hath been paid to
 our *Interests*, it does not yet appear that They
 have been crown'd with the same Success. It is
 true, indeed, that his *Imperial Majesty* hath at
 length consented to abolish the *Ostend Company*,
 and all Trade to the *East Indies* from the *Austrian*
Netherlands ; but This hath been confess'd, on
 both Sides, to be the *least material Article*, with
 Regard to Us ; and every Body knows that it
 might have been effectually suppress'd at first for a
 Trifle not worth mentioning, in Comparison to
 those immense Sums, which it hath since cost us.
 Besides, I observed before that the Bustle We
 have made about *this Trade* hath set almost every
 Nation upon Schemes of the *same Kind* ; and that
 even the *Emperor* Himself is now pursuing a Plan
 for carrying it on in some other Part of the World,
 not prohibited by *Treaty*. Our *principal Points*
 therefore are the undisturb'd Possession of *Gi-*
braltar and the Island of *Minorca*, the Freedom
 of *Commerce*, and Reparation to our *plunder'd Mer-*
chants. As to the *first*, I cannot possibly conceive
 how our *Right to the Possession of these Places* can
 be said to be effectually ascertain'd and secur'd,
 when the very *Treaty*, upon which the *Spaniards*
 ground their *Pretensions* to them, is recall'd and
 confirm'd in all the *subsequent Treaties*, by which
 We are told They have renounc'd *those Pretensi-*
ons ; especially, when it is farther consider'd that
 They have constantly refused to renounce Them
specifically, and have even given us the most ocular
 Demonstration of their Intentions, by erecting
Forts and other *military Works* to annoy our Gar-
 rison, as well as our Ships in the Bay. The *Free-*
dom of Commerce and *Reparation to our Merchants*
 are so closely interwoven together, that they may
 be properly consider'd under *one Head* ; and what
 hath

hath been done upon This? Why, the Time limited by the Treaty of *Seville*, for the Examination and Decision of *that Affair*, expired without any Thing being settled. Another Term of *three Years* was then agreed upon; above *one Year* of which is already lapsed, and I do not hear that the *Merchants* have yet received any Satisfaction. But as the *Commissaries*, on our Part, are now return'd, and the *Parliament* is just upon the Point of meeting, We shall soon know what They have done; and I heartily wish that a *certain Gentleman's* Prediction in the *House of Commons*, when the Treaty of *Seville* came first under Deliberation there, may not be verifi'd; viz. *that the Execution of this Commission would cost the Nation more than the Merchants would ever get by it.* — If therefore We have not effectually insisted on either of these *great Points*, whilst the *dearest Interest* of *Spain* remain'd in Suspence, and must have remain'd so without our Assistance; how can We expect to obtain them, when We have given *that Pledge* out of our own Hands, and *Spain* stands no longer in Need of Us?

But it will be said, perhaps, (nay, it hath been said in Effect already) that We could not purchase *Peace* at too dear a Rate, as our Circumstances then stood; and that We had better yield to any Terms than plunge the Nation into a *War*. If This was our Case, I should be glad to know why the same Considerations did not prevail long before; for if We had undertaken to effectuate the Introduction of *Don Carlos* with *Spanish* Garrisons into *Italy*, at the Congress of *Cambray*, instead of opposing it with so much Vigour, the Court of *Spain* would have had no Occasion to throw Themselves into the Arms of the *Emperor*; and if We had been happy enough, at the same
Time,

Time, to discover that *the Guaranty of the Pragmatic Sanction* was only a Bugbear, that frighten'd us without any Reason, there is no Room to suppose that the *Emperor* would not have comply'd with the Demands of the *Spaniards*, upon *that Condition*, as readily as He hath done since. In this Case, I say, *Great Britain* would not only have saved an infinite Expence in sending out so many *naval Armaments* to all Parts of the World, keeping up *foreign Armies*, and paying *foreign Subsidies*, with all their *necessary Concomitants at home*; but might likewise have carried on her *Commerce* without Interruption, or such a continued Series of *Depredations*, as our *Merchants* have suffer'd for many Years past. Nay, if our *Ministers* had happen'd to make all these wise Discoveries at the Congress of *Soissons*, or even when the Treaty of *Seville* was in Agitation, We might have avoided some Part of these Expences and Calamities; for it is directly said in the *Answer to the Imperial Decree* against *that Treaty*, published at *Ratisbon*, and said to be written by the *French Minister*, * “ that
 “ the Court of *Vienna* did, in some Measure, put
 “ the Allies of *Hanover* in the Way of the Negotiation, which now fills Them with Indignation
 “ and Resentment; and that nothing hath been
 “ done, but what the *Emperor* was very ready to
 “ do Himself, had CERTAIN CONDITIONS, essential to the Interests of HIS HOUSE, been comply'd with.

But our greatest Misfortune is, that the very Measures We chose to take, for obtaining a *lasting Peace*, are likely to involve us in a *general War*; and, what is still worse, after We have spent so many Millions of Money, suffered so many grievous

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* *Hist Register*, vol. 15. p. 185.

vous Losses in our *Trade*, and made such *large Concessions*, in order to avoid it. This is what the *Country Party* have long ago foretold, and I am heartily sorry to find their Predictions so nearly accomplish'd; for it appears very plainly, from the foregoing Deduction, to what Causes the present Commotions in *Europe* are really owing; I mean to the Treaty of *Seville*, which opened a Way for the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, and to the last Treaty of *Vienna*, which compleated the Union between *France* and *Spain*, as the *other* laid a Foundation for it, by separating *Spain* from the *Emperor*.

How ridiculous therefore is it to argue, as *some Men* do, that the present War in *Europe* was occasioned merely by the accidental Death of the late King of *Poland*, which *no human Wisdom could foresee*? It may be said, indeed, that the Demise of *that Prince* was the immediate Occasion of the Flame's bursting out; but the combustible Matter was laid long before, and the least Spark was sufficient to set Fire to the Train. The Vacancy of the Throne of *Poland* happened to come first in the Way; but any other Accident in *Europe* would have had just the same Effect.

The Court of *Vienna* was so far from imputing the present War to the Death of *Augustus*, that They represented the * "*Polish Election* as an Handle "*only for putting those Designs in Execution,* "*which France had meditated long before the* "*Throne of Poland became vacant.*

Besides, it ought to be considered that although the particular Year, Month, or Day, on which King *Augustus* would die, could not be foreseen; yet it is well known that He was *above threescore Years of Age*, and in a *very infirm State of Health*.

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* See the Remarks on the Motives of the French King's Resolutions.

No wise People therefore would care to pay for an *Annuity of Peace upon such a Life* ; and We ought, at least, to have been secured against a *Contingency*, which could not be very far off, according to the ordinary Course of Nature. But *Contingencies* are Things, which *some Men* seem intirely to neglect. They consider only the *present Time* ; and if They can but make a Shift to put off the Evil for a *Day*, They seldom take any *Thought for the Morrow*.

I know it will be said, (as it hath been said before, upon other Occasions) that † *the Judgment from the EVENT of Things meerly is not the Judgment of REASON*. I grant that it is not meerly so ; especially when We speak of *fortuitous Events*, which God only can foresee ; though the *Court Party* have often founded their Triumphs upon *such Accidents* ; and I will venture to affirm that no Men were ever more lucky in *that Particular*. But the *Events* We speak of, at present, are only such as flow from *natural Causes* ; in the Foresight of which all *political Wisdom* consists. I believe the Gentlemen on the *Country Side* do not pretend to any *supernatural Light*, or *Gifts of Divination* ; and yet That must be the Case, if all the *Events*, which They have foretold, are meerly *accidental*. If They had judg'd right upon *one or two Points* only, it might have been imputed to *Guess-work*, or *Chance* ; but to be justified in their Opinion of publick Transactions, for seven or eight Years together, by the Consequences of them, in almost every Particular, is certainly owing to something more than a meer Run of *Luck*, and can proceed from nothing but a right Judgment of *Causes and Effects*.

† *Defence of the Enquiry*, P. 35.

But it may be said again, of what Use is it, at present, to tell us that *one Set of Gentlemen* had more Sagacity and Foresight than *another*? The *Events* of our late Transactions are now visible to every Body; the Nation is in Danger; and *what is to be done*? This, indeed, is a proper Question; but the Answer is not so easy. Things seem to be brought to such a Pass, that I wish it may not puzzle the ablest Heads in *England* to extricate us with Honour out of that Labyrinth of *Engagements*, in which We are unhappily involved.

We find ourselves oblig'd, by several *Treaties*, to assist the *Emperor*, if He should be attack'd; and it is said that We have been already call'd upon to perform *these Engagements*.

By the Treaty of *Seville*, We are ty'd down, in the strongest Manner, to secure *Don Carlos* in the Possession of his *Italian Dominions for ever, against ALL EVENTS*. His *Catholick Majesty* alludes very plainly to *this Engagement* in his late *complaisant Memorial* to the King of *Great Britain*; where He acknowledges the *generous Part*, which his Majesty hath acted, with Regard to *Don Carlos*.

And if it should be true, as a Rumour flies about, that the Plan of Operations, which the *French* are now pursuing in *Italy*, was first chalk'd out by Us, in Case the *Emperor* should not make good his Engagements to *Spain*; what Part can We possibly take in *these Disputes*, without wounding our Honour, or betraying our Interest?

If it should be likewise true, as I have heard it whisper'd, that We promis'd *France* our Assistance, about *four Years ago*, to restore King *Stanislaus* to the Throne of *Poland*, whenever *Augustus* should dye, and that our *Minister* was even order'd to co-operate with the *French Minister* for that Purpose;
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if This, I say, is true, and We should have since given the *Emperor* any Encouragement to oppose the Election of *that Prince*, how are We to act upon the present Occasion?

In short, whichever Way We turn ourselves, or whatever Side We take, if We take any, We shall not only involve our selves in a dangerous and expensive War, but likewise incur the Reproach and Resentment of *one Side*, or the *other*; since *both* of Them think Themselves intitled to our Assistance.

If, to avoid these Difficulties, We chuse a State of *absolute Neutrality*, and leave the *opposite Powers* to dispute their own Quarrel among Themselves, the Consequence may be fatal to *Europe*, and at length involve *Us* in the common Calamity.

The Question therefore recurs, *what is to be done?*—Or *is any Thing to be done?*—Ought We to involve our selves in a War, in which We have *no particular Interest* concern'd?—Or shall We sit down in Quiet, and run the Hazard of seeing *Europe* become a Prey to the Arms of the *Conqueror*?—For my Part, I cannot pretend to answer these Questions; and the present Situation of Affairs is surrounded with so many Difficulties on every Side, that I believe the wisest Man in *England*, as I said before, would be at a Loss to judge what is most expedient in *such a Crisis*. But one Thing seems to be very obvious; that *those Persons*, who have intangled us in the *present Difficulties*, are the most unlikely to work us out of them again; for how can *They* speak to *foreign Courts* with that *Dignity* and *Authority*, which are necessary upon such an Occasion, when *They* have already dealt with every one of Them, and disoblig'd Them all in their Turns? It is not therefore surprizing to hear *such Men* crying out for Help,

Help, or to see Them ready to catch at any Hint, in order to justify their future Measures by the Sentiments and Characters of *Those*, whom They affect to despise.

When the Ship is really in Danger, all Hands must be at Work; and every Man will naturally endeavour, for his own Sake, to prevent her sinking; but, in the present Case, it is necessary to know our *whole Danger*, before any Gentleman will venture to give his Opinion upon it. There may be many more *secret Engagements*, or *Transactions*, than have yet come to our Knowledge; and how can any Body pretend to determine what Measures are most proper to be taken, till the *whole State of Affairs* is fully explain'd?

The *ministerial Writers* will cavil, perhaps, at this Conduct of the *Country Party*, and represent it as the Effect of a Resolution not to give the Government any Assistance, in Time of Danger, unless the Management of Affairs is put into their own Hands; but surely nothing can be more ridiculous than such an Imputation, in our *present Circumstances*. Men must be quite drunk, and even mad with the Lust of Power, to covet it on *such Terms*; and therefore if any of Them should be induced to undertake the publick Service, it ought to be imputed to their Zeal for his *Majesty's Honour*, and a generous Design of rescuing their *Country* out of its *present Difficulties*.—But I have done; and should not have made even these short Remarks, had I not accidentally met with a † *Pamphlet* just published; in which the *Author* discovers all the Marks of *Timidity*, under the Disguise of *blustering Language*, and exhibits to us the

† *A Letter to the CRAFTSMEN*, printed for Roberts,

the ridiculous Image of *natural Insolence* struggling with *Consciousness of Guilt*.

What I proposed was to state our Case, as I found it, with Regard to *foreign Affairs*; and to point out the several Gradations, by which We have been drawn into it. How We are to be extricated out of it, is beyond my Province, and must be referr'd to the Wisdom of *Parliament*.

I designed, indeed, to have added a State of our *domestick Affairs*, which have kept an equal Pace with *Those abroad*, as I am ready to prove by *Accounts* now lying before me; but these Sheets being already swell'd to a much larger Compass than I proposed at first, the *second Part* must be reserv'd for another Opportunity.

However, there is *one Point*, which requires immediate Consideration, under our *present, unhappy Circumstances*, and therefore must not be intirely pass'd over in Silence. I mean the *NAVY DEBT*; which is now calculated at near TWO MILLIONS, and hath been chiefly contracted since the Year 1722.

This Debt arises by the modern Practice of exceeding the annual Sum granted and appropriated by Parliament for the Service of the *Navy*, in order to keep up a larger Body of *Land Forces*, and at the same Time persuade unwary People that the *current Expences of the Year* are kept within due Bounds; whereas, in Truth, We are every Year running in Debt upon that Account; for the Service of the *Navy* being justly more popular than That of the *Army*, it is natural for *Ministers*, who have private Reasons for not raising the *whole Supplies* within the Year, to cloak all *Deficiencies* under the most *favourite Head*. But this Practice is of very mischievous Consequence to the Publick, and hath often been complain'd of as such in *Parliament*,

liament, as well as from the *Throne*; though hitherto without Redress.

At the latter End of Queen *Anne's* Reign, the Parliament represented to her Majesty, " that increasing the *annual Expences* beyond the Supplies granted is an *illegal Practice*; a dangerous Invasion of the *Rights of Parliament*; and an Attempt, which differs very little from *levying Money without Consent of Parliament.*" — I chuse to quote these Passages from the *Representation*, at that Time, because They seem to have had so much Weight with a *certain honourable Gentleman*, that I find them transcribed into his own Observations on the *Navy Debt*, in the Year 1711.

At the opening of the Parliament in Oct. 1721, (soon after *this Gentleman* came into Power) the late King observed to Them, " that They could not but be sensible of the ill Consequences, which arise from such a large Debt unprovided for; that as long as the *Navy* and *victualling Bills* are at a very *high Discount*, they do not only affect *all other publick Credit*, but increase the Charge and Expence of the *current Service.*" — He farther observes, " that *this Debt*, of all others, is the most heavy and burthensome.

The present great Debt of the *Navy* is therefore a Subject, which seems to require immediate Consideration; and it is hoped that an effectual Stop will be put to such Practices for the future.

Neither would it be altogether improper to make some Enquiries into the present State of our *Shipping*, the Condition of our *Stores*, and the Reasons of that deplorable Desertion of our *Seamen*, which, if not speedily prevented, will render even our *Fleet* it self of but little Use.

All These are Points, which certainly deserve the Attention of a *British Parliament* ; especially at a Time, when *Europe* is threaten'd with a general War, and our *Navy* at least ought to be put under the best Regulations.

Before I conclude, let me just mention *another Practice*, of the most dangerous Consequence to a *free State* ; and That is the Method of granting Money without Limitation, Appropriation, or even so much as specifying the Services to be perform'd. This is commonly, and indeed not improperly, called a *Vote of Credit* ; since it reposes an absolute Confidence in the *King* and his *Ministers* to act at Discretion, and make what Demands They please upon the People. I say, therefore, that it is a most dangerous Power, and may be made use of to destroy the very Being of *Parliaments*, by depositing the *Purse of the Nation* in the Hands of the *Crown*, without any *Restriction*, or *Account* ; for though *Ministers* are always ready to promise *Accounts*, when They are pleading for such *unlimited Grants*, yet they are constantly deny'd, when call'd for, as the *Journals of Parliament* abundantly testify ; and This is one good Reason for suspecting the Use of them.

On the other Hand, all the Arguments advanc'd in Favour of *these Grants*, such as *sudden Exigences*, *unforeseen Accidents*, and *secret Service*, are meer Fallacies, to say no worse of them, and may be urged with the same Force at all Times, and by every *Minister*, without any Discrimination.

As to the personal Character of the *Prince*, it hath nothing to do in this Case, nor ought it to be introduc'd upon such an Occasion ; for every Body knows that Concessions to a *good King* are always made Precedents for the same Complaisance to a *bad one* ; and, indeed, who will presume to
K make

make the Distinction ? Besides, the Character of the *best Prince*, that ever wore a Crown, ought not to be put in Competition with the *Privilege of Parliament*, and the *Liberties of a whole People*.

But if *Votes of Credit* are dangerous at all Times, They are peculiarly so just before a GENERAL ELECTION, when They may be employ'd to corrupt the *People* with their own Money, and destroy the Freedom of *that House*, from whence They receive their Force.

Whoever reads the Memoirs of *Philip de Commines*, will see that the Subjects of *Charles Duke of Burgundy* lost their Liberties by a *Power of the same Nature*, which that Prince artfully gain'd, under Pretence of keeping Himself always prepared against any sudden Surprizes from his Neighbour the King of *France*. And one great Blow was given to the Liberties of *France* it self, by the *like Concessions* to *Lewis the Eleventh*.

But the most remarkable Instance of the bad Consequences of such extraordinary Grants is recorded by *Dr. Geddes* ; who tells us that † *Henry 2d*, King of *Castile*, being resolved on a War with the *Moorish King of Granada*, in the Year 1406, demanded a large Supply of the *Cortes* for carrying it on ; but the *Cortes*, judging the Sum too great for the People to pay, absolutely refused to grant more than *one Third* of what the *King* demanded ; and when no Importunities could prevail upon Them to alter their Resolution, the *King* gave his Assent to the Bill, which They had pass'd for that Purpose ; “ *but at the same Time desired that in Case the Sum, which They had given, should be found not to be sufficient, They would empower Him, without assembling the Cortes,* “ *which*

* *Geddes's Tracts*, Vol. 1. p. 331.

“ which would require Time, to raise Money upon
 “ the Subject, to supply that Deficiency.

Dr. Geddes observes “ that although the giving the King *such a Power* was fiercely opposed by a great many *Procurators* as a Thing, that struck at the very Root of the Authority of a *Cortes*, it was carried by a *Majority*; and tho’ it was granted only for a *Year*, yet That was enough to create *such a Precedent*, as would encourage their *future Kings* to desire to have the *same Power*, and to take it very ill, if it were deny’d Them; and by such *WEAK*, or *CORRUPT CONCESSIONS* as These it was, that the *Spanish Cortes’s* came to lose all their Authority.

ERRATUM.

Page 35, for *Master-piece of Politicks*, read *Master-string*, which They had touch’d with Success.

F I N I S.

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[illegible]

[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them. The list includes names such as "John A. Smith", "John B. Smith", "John C. Smith", "John D. Smith", "John E. Smith", "John F. Smith", "John G. Smith", "John H. Smith", "John I. Smith", "John J. Smith", "John K. Smith", "John L. Smith", "John M. Smith", "John N. Smith", "John O. Smith", "John P. Smith", "John Q. Smith", "John R. Smith", "John S. Smith", "John T. Smith", "John U. Smith", "John V. Smith", "John W. Smith", "John X. Smith", "John Y. Smith", and "John Z. Smith".